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I. PRELUDE
If law is anything today, it is dispirited. It lacks life, vitality,
enchantment, vision. Neither law nor its practitioners sing-or even
hum. My students tell me that they know this but want to hope for
more. This article tries to suggest something more, which is already
present in America's state constitutions if we can dare turn to hear it.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, Ne-
braska; B.A. Swarthmore College; J.D., Ph.D. University of Wisconsin.
Deep thanks to those who have been willing to treat this text as friendly, and have helped
call me to change it, including Ruth Colker, Richard Harnsberger, Roger Kirst, Stewart Ma-
cauley, Carol Ochs, Ramona Paetzold, Michael Perry, Tom Shaffer, and John Snowden. The
remaining intransigence is mine.
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It is the voice of the spirit of the laws of the land. It sings of a vision,
and this article is an attempt to tell enough of the story of that vision
so that you, too, may hear "an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law."'
To listen for the spirit, we can best attend to (in addition to the
language of law texts) language of the spirit, language in which hu-
mankind has lived in hopes of relating to Ultimate Reality for millen-
nia. The spirit we hope to tap is not necessarily theistic, but there is
some correspondence among ideas of spirit, consciousness and God.2
As with the best of such language, we must speak not only of belief
but also of doubt and mystery beyond necessary reason.
This essay examines a strain of constitutional law, anchored by
actual judicial language about the spirit of the law, which participates
in the discourse identified in two key law review articles, Suzanna
Sherry's "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution" and Thomas
Grey's "Origins of the Unwritten Constitution". The essay also uses
nonjudicial language of the spirit within the law, from authors of sev-
eral spiritual traditions.
Grey's classic article argues that constitutions are not exhausted
by their written incarnations, but have a fullness and depth as the
binding corpus of foundational law which the words of the text can-
not contain. Both Sherry and Grey identify the sources of the funda-
mental law underlying and complementing our written constitution,
and indicate why these foundational sources, recorded and unre-
corded, are not reducible in content or use to mere individual subjec-
tivity, mere judges' whim. Sherry and Grey write about colonial era
cases and establish the existence of the sources of unwritten law. This
piece deals with the content, the nature, of a key voice of the unwrit-
ten law, through the language and spirit which nineteenth century
state constitutional judicial writing brings to light. This voice is local,
traditional, participatory, democratic, rooted in spirit, in the People
and in "the law of the land."
Although 'state constitutional law is enjoying a renaissance, that
rebirth is seen mainly in the light of its relationship to federal consti-
tutional law.4 In contrast, this piece stresses an entire conversation
1. O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 170 (1920).
2. S. MOORE, LET THIS MIND BE IN YOU (1985), (esp. Ch. 10'and 11).
3. Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolution-
ary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 852 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV.
959 (1985).
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concerning constitutive law which took place at the local level during
the last century, a kind of American judicial discourse which the fed-
eral Supreme Court suppressed in its own opinions. This discourse is
probably best described as a form of naturalism, although in the past
it would have been called natural law; the distinction is an attempt to
dissociate the "higher law" at issue here from what the positivists
viewed as moralistic, punitive and inherently conservative.5 My
agenda is not conservative in either the political or the philosophical
sense, although I share with commentators like George Will and Alan
Bloom a call to move beyond the stasis of relativism or pure skepti-
cism. The focus on state law is one positive, reconstructive path open
to potentially redistributive legal scholars.6
Along with the turn towards a decentralized view of American
jurisprudence, the discourse calls for something akin to a leap of
faith-something which would call relentlessly analytic thinkers like
Thomas Nagel toward a stance from which I believe they could sense
the Nowhere, the Objective view point which they seek but resist.7
That leap requires an appreciation of uncertainty, of mystery, in the
context of reflection. At core, the piece tells a story about being some-
one, somewhere, interpreting and advocating law, without being re-
duced to mere, hopeless subjectivity or to dry, lifeless detachment.
This call paradoxically claims that the correct form of bringing
spirit to the law requires a greater personal inwardness which grounds
in and makes more likely, a greater perception of interpersonal gener-
ality. It acknowledges that both distinctiveness and universality are
present in that greater inwardness, but that the closest approach to
true universality (human nature) must be made by an authentic atti-
tude of attention which involves looking inward. And this is a prob-
lem within the article itself. How can I write something which tries to
speak within a dominant culture of "reasonable" white males, claim-
ing all the while that I can only speak authentically, personally as a
woman-yet that mysteriously I also speak as fully human? How
can I tell you how important it is for me to be different, yet invite
those of you who are in the extant predominant voice, not only to
listen but to hope to hear me?
This is a version of the problem discussed recently by Alisdair
5. For a discussion of naturalism, see M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW
(1988).
6. Collins & Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REv. 216
(1988).
7. T. NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986).
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Maclntyre, Clifford Geertz, and Michael Walzer, of different worlds
among speakers and listeners.8 If language depends on culture (and
gender), and cultures are plural, then how can one language translate
into another? If to make sense, a person must speak from within a
tradition and the listeners must share that tradition to know what is
being said, how can one from a different culture (or gender) address
you? An elegant analytical answer to that occurs in David Tracy's
Plurality and Ambiguity.9 He reminds us that within a tradition,
there is always a plurality of views, of world perspectives, of life ex-
periences. The notion of a unitary tradition is at best partial. There
are always subscripts, splinter groups, heretics, new hybrids. These
are, even in their opposition, part of the tradition. We already debate
within traditions over the identity of the tradition. The meanings
within a culture are always, to varying degrees, up for grabs. And the
history of a culture is rich with undercurrents which contemporaries
claim represent the "true" tradition.
An example of that tension between the individual and her tradi-
tion, for me, is the Catholic church. I do not experience it as the
Church which the Pope apparently experiences; he and I disagree on
a number of vital issues about authority, hierarchy, gender, ministry,
and theology. He and I agree that the Church is the Mystical Body
(though I think it tacitly enfolds all humankind), and its very nature
and unity are a matter of experienced but unknowable gift. Like most
people, part of me believes that deep down he really knows the truth;
I further think the truth is something which can never be fully spo-
ken, yet participates in reality. I know that beyond my tendency to
equate truth with "what agrees with me," both the Pope and I know
that truth and mystery interwine. Despite many things in the domi-
nant Catholic tradition which I find outrageous, I believe that it also
contains greater truth than I have yet been able to recollect. I have
medieval mystics (Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Meister
Eckhart) to back me up; I can cite (and, more importantly, learn
from) contemporaries like Thomas Merton, Teilhard de Chardin,
Helen Luke and Sebastian Moore. I have gospel passages and scrip-
ture from the Hebrew bible. But the wide resources of the tradition
will never guarantee agreement. Still, the Pope and I hope to share a
common language.
I have found teaching law and theology at a secular law college
8. A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); M. WALZER, IN-
TERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987); C. GEERTZ, WORKS AND LIVES (1988).
9. D..TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY (1987).
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that not everyone agrees with me-conservative Catholics, those of
my tradition, often least of all-and no one agrees with me com-
pletely. But I have also found that students and I are very interested
in talking about law and spirit, and that the talk is not just to con-
vince. They doubt a common language or shared values, but they are
open to being found by them. We meet in good faith dialogue-some-
thing happens. We leave the class changed; I warn them that is the
risk they (and I) take.
And so I have changed this essay. After several male readers'
responses, I have added a voice directed toward the dominant tradi-
tion. My voice alone was perceived as "bright and unpredictable,"
and chancy stuff for law reviews. I have tried to move it towards the
conventions of the journals. I want to enter the discourse about law
which involves all those hoping to be of good faith who want to pur-
sue justice and who care about the goodness of the law. The law can-
not be valuable without the spirit; it cannot be real without the letter.
How the two combine is a matter of reason and heart-and mystery.
This essay is an attempt to ground a discussion of the spirit of the law,
of law's inwardness, in the discourse of the American state courts as
they continued for a century to do what the federal courts tried to
avoid-to talk openly about the spirit of the law, the higher law, the
unwritten law, even the natural law. I want to speak in their vocabu-
lary, and then to point to their discourse to suggest that to discern the
spirit of the law, to move beyond the fear of hopeless fragmented,
subjectivity, we can consider trusting spiritual writers, those within all
our available traditions who have most wisely thought, lived and writ-
ten about spirit and prayer.
I go to someone from the Jewish tradition, Abraham Joshua Hes-
chel, to talk about spirit and prayer, because I claim to recognize
truth in what he says. The form of authentic inwardness in relation to
text (because law always has some text, be it constitution, statute, reg-.
ulation, contract or case law) which Heschel says prayer represents,
describes an attitude of mind and heart which I present for the
reader's evaluation, as trustworthy. It is not raw, unbounded subjec-
tivity, but a form of attention to the words of a people's tradition (of a
polity's code) which represents both a disciplined inwardness and a
fidelity to the direction which the outward, public writing suggests.
It is not that prayer by itself is a sufficient hermeneutic, but that a
hermeneutic which stops short of prayer will always be deficient. The
prayerfulness includes both a reflective aspect (bringing the text into
the heart, the mind into the heart) and an acknowledgement of the
225]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
limits of rational reflection. There is an element of mystery, in addi-
tion to, not in place of, reflection.
The interplay between reflection and mystery, between what can
be written and what remains unwritten, avoids the worst flaws of
what Nancy Rosenblum calls "the law of the heart" alone."° She por-
trays an anarchic, romantic individualism which reduces the fully in-
ward to idiosyncratic willfulness. Her argument is that the fully
romantic does not presume universality of inwardness, but only uni-
queness.'" My thesis is that the individual contains both the unique
and the universal. The anarchic rebel will, like G.K. Chatterton's
Man Who Was Thursday, find in her antinomian depths that she is
with the rest of us, all "outsiders" yet connected. In our current cul-
tural situation, we need to claim some way of speaking among our-
selves which involves a trust of sameness yet a respect for difference.
Further, in the Judeo-Christian (and other) traditions, the heart is not
the feelings, but the center of the person. At the center, our whole
being is the meeting of the unique with the universal image of God, or
the postmodern self, or of the essence of being. Subjective and objec-
tive, same and different, converge.
I point in this essay towards the prevailing sense of sameness, but
much of the essay is done differently. It is not solely in abstract, dis-
cursive, linear style. It is in narrative, imagery, personal story, and
maybe even poetry. There is a story behind that.
The story starts with my eight and a half years between law
school and teaching. During that time, in order to remain sane while
practicing and clerking, I began to read theology and mysticism.
When I began to re-enter the discourse of the academic journals, I
found that less had changed than I might have hoped. There were
still (but more) versions of why liberalism was incoherent, there were
orthodox counterattacks, and there still was no overt vision. It began
to occur to me that I had gone to the world's sacred writings for
vision, all those years.
Just as I left the academy, Arthur Leff had argued that we
needed someone "like unto the Lord", Roberto Unger had called on
God to speak, and the level of academic irritability had gotten rela-
tively high.' 2 In the next few years, law and politics got reconnected,
from law review articles through tenure decisions, and still without
10. N. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM (1988).
11. See, e.g., one attempt at this pure particularism, R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY
AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
12. R. UNGER, PASSION (1984).
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vision. Robert Cover suggested that law was integral to a commu-
nity's vision of itself. He began to write about Messianic Law, saw a
vision of a universal Torah, and then died.' 3 Something like acknowl-
edged visions began to be suggested. Mark Tushnet accused himself
of mushy utopianism, but suggested decentralization.' 4 Liberals re-
constructed philosophical liberalism and tried to acknowledge it as a
full belief system.15 People came out in favor of tradition, natural
law, and virtue.16 Michael Sandel suggested the foundations of com-
munitarianism. 7 Republicanism was resurrected, reconstituted, re-
vised. Commentators moved between re-vision and tradition. Visions
of some substance had begun to appear.
Something else happened in those years. Women began to write
more openly about their different voices, their different ears, their dif-
ferent selves. Women began to make explicit ways in which the fe-
male was fundamentally different from the male. They said that the
personal was the political. Carol Gilligan said that a relational ethic,
a morality of care rather than rules, was intrinsic to women, and that
the more abstract and analytical morality of post-Enlightenment
thinking relegated this different form of moral action to an inferior
status.II Women scholars feared it was too dangerous to acknowledge
differences, because once again women would find that to be other
than male was to be less than "human." But they also began to claim
the value of their own way of speaking and writing. 19
This sense of difference extended to modes of expression. Wo-
men were less likely to use linear, discursive "reasoning" in writing
about an issue; feminist jurisprudence claimed that this different,
more intuitive style was no less valid, and that in its absence, dis-
course was fatally flawed.2" Much of the feminist writing on this sub-
13. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Messianic Law
in NOMOS XXX: LAW RELIGION AND MORALITY (Chapman and Pennock eds. 1988); Cover,
Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. LAW & RELIG. 65 (1988).
14. Note 38 infra.
15. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); A. GUT-
MANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980).
16. E.g., Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1073 (1986).
17. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1985).
18. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
19. Card, Women's Voices and Ethical Ideals: Must We Mean What We Say? ETHICS 125
(Oct. 1988); CRITICAL INQUIRY, Volume 8 No. 2: Writing and Sexual Difference (1981); M.F.
BELENKY, B.M. CLINCHY, N.R. GOLDBERGER, AND J.M. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF
KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MIND (1986).
20. Scales, The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
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ject is convincing to me; I recognize that the ways in which truth is
revealed, even momentarily and partially, are much more varied than
masculine discourse suggests. To some extent, male and female write
in both modes, as the 19th century state cases by all male justices in
this piece demonstrate. Thus the first version of this essay was delib-
erately not in the dominant analytic mode in which I had done all my
previous academic writing, but it has changed.
The first version was much more allusive and poetic. It had a
more distinctive texture, and fewer "road signs." It was organized
less explicitly, and relied more on implication and image. I was asked
if I.knew what I was saying (I did). Now I have tried to make it more
directly accessible, but it risks having lost some of its mystery, in try-
ing to make explicit some things which, as the cases themselves sug-
gest, cannot be made fully explicit.
Ironically, it is the mystery which is the greatest source of free-
dom and growth, of my being able both to believe and to be open to
changing that belief. The mystery allows a return to belief, from a
new place: "a true description of what one believed earlier has in it
the seeds of reconciliation with what he believes now. ' '2I The earlier
version of this essay had the seeds of this version, but only my read-
ers' response let the seeds take root. Joseph Vining claims that it is
this very move-from belief to new belief-which frightens lawyers
about belief. But it is this very move which is the invitation to life,
because it promises that belief is not a trap. Belief in words makes
them live, but with belief come doubt and dialogue, and thus a process
fostering growth and change.
This prelude, and the similar passage at the end, as well as some
stanzas along the way, are revisions and invitations. They are at-
tempts tb speak initially in the terms of discourse of the legal acad-
emy, footnotes and all, in order to attempt some translation of what
the rest is saying. But the invitation is genuinely to enter the world of
the Other, mysterious voice, to let go of the analytic handholds from
time to time, and to risk beginning to glimpse what my discourse
arises from-the beginnings of a song of vision, a vision both old and
new, a spiritual vision-of the spirit of the law of the land.
II. ONE VOICE OF THE LAW OF THE LAND
My computer ate the first two partial drafts of this essay; those
21. J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 596 (1986).
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mechanical meals were providential editing. As an assistant profes-
sor, by definition I lacked the humor and perspective necessary for
self-correction or good rationalizations; intervention was necessary.
Perhaps my subconscious was wiser than my tenure-seeking persona.
Wandering numbly through my apartment, betrayed by my PC, I
found my 20 year old copy of Walter Lippmann's The Public Philoso-
phy 22 and Abraham Joshua Heschel's Quest for God.23 From Hes-
chel, I recognized that what my earlier draft thoughts on our
interpretive relationship to text were missing, was prayer. From
Lippmann I recalled his early insight that we have been "missing" in
the public sphere, for decades.
First a little on prayer, then public philosophy, because prayer is
the touchier subject. As Harold Berman notes, to talk about such
things is to risk being attacked for "overstepping the bounds of public
discourse. ' ' 24 The relationships among interpretation, hermeneutics,
and prayer should not be surprising, however, given how much theol-
ogy centers around scripture. Hermeneutics was a stranger to law
reviews fifteen years ago when it was a long familiar discipline in sem-
inaries and divinity schools. The texts over which the greatest dis-
putes in our culture had raged, aside from perhaps over Shakespeare
and Plato, were the documents contributing to the Book-predomi-
nately the so-called "Old" and "New" Testaments (or the Hebrew
and Christian Bibles). Scripture was to illuminate the truth. The pri-
mary use of Scripture, however, by those who took it seriously (and
reverently) was for worship, for prayer, for speaking to God, for in-
voking God's presence. Whether transcendent, immanent, communal
or contemplative, the words of scripture come alive in relationship.
"Conversation occurs if, and only if, we risk ourselves by allowing the
questions of the text."' 25 They were words given, words received,
words to be attended to and lived-words of prayer.
The words of Scripture aroused disputes, passions, institutions,
enclaves, perhaps even wars.., as have the words of constitutions.26
Neither our national scripture nor traditional Judeo-Christian scrip-
ture is self-interpreting or self-inspiriting. For a constitution to live, it
must be taken seriously, attended to, pondered in the heart, discussed,
22. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955).
23. A.J. HESCHEL, QUEST FOR GOD (1954).
24. Berman, "Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modem State", Williamsburg
Charter Nat'l Symposium on Religion Liberty Clauses in American Public Life, at 107 (1988).
25. Tracy, supra note 9, at 20.
26. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 7 (1984).
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interpreted, and, finally, in the presence of the best of the spirit of our
community of the United States within the world, it must be, care-
fully, prayed.
This is the uncomfortable part-embarrassing even. God lan-
guage (even Ultimate Reality language) is not polite talk in academia.
I hear the historian who, at the very mention of an unwritten consti-
tution underlying Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence,
state constitutions, and the U.S. Constitution, said "Talk like that
scares me-it smacks of mysticism." I hear my years of agnosticism
muttering "How can you give credence to such irrational, sectarian
stuff?" I recall the journal which almost rejected my solicited review
of Bruce Ackerman's book on social justice, because "she makes it
obvious she believes in God." I hear the rustling, the dismissal, the
attrition that words like "God" and "love" and "truth" and "justice"
create in polite legal academic company. I hear a mentor telling me
of the several inquiries about my resume' (which includes a piece ti-
tled "God and Mammon and [Novak's] Democratic Capitalism"27):
"Is she some sort of a religious nut?"
To unsettle that last question I want to tell you about Brother
Juniper, just briefly. I will try to signal when in this essay the mysti-
cal stuff is coming, but by next time I will hope to have suggested why
it, in tandem with what we easily recognize as rational, is irresistibly
helpful to understanding law.
Brother Juniper, who joined the Order of St. Francis about 1210,
was famous (or notorious) for "his outrageous antics, his patience and
his deep desire to imitate Christ. ' 28 Murray Bodo created a sketch of
Juniper based upon the 14th century stories about him and his friend
Brother Tendalbene, whom he asked: "Tendalbene, didn't you al-
ways say that the trouble with being too reasonable was that we
would forget the mystery of things?"29
For Juniper, God found fools and sages alike:
What matters in the end, I guess, is that we try to live the mystery,
foolishly or wisely; that we realize wisdom or foolishness is never
an answer. In fact wisdom and foolishness might be the same
thing: a way to God who has found us in both wisdom and foolish-
ness before we went looking for him.3 °
Juniper applauded those called to reflect, to study Scripture, but not
27. 62 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1984).
28. M. BODO, JUNIPER: FRIEND OF FRANCIS, FOOL OF GOD (1983).
29. Id. at 69.
30. Id. at 70.
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when their seriousness extinguished the mystery, the play, of life. "It
is magic that has gone out of our lives ... Everything is reasonable
now, my brother, and the brothers are holy in a reasonable sort of
way."31 How did the brothers become reasonably holy?
... the only thing that can kill magic is ridicule. And when mock-
ery came catapulting into our enchanted world, we became reason-
able and defended our world with logic. When we did that, the
magic died and we began leading predictable, defendable lives.32
From Juniper's folly, I glean this request to the reader: do not mock
this text, please. That is a nearly irresistible reaction by clever read-
ers; even someone as impressive as Peter Teachout succumbed when
faced with Milner Ball's risking uncomfortable topics like God and
Law.33 It does not become the commentator. If there is something of
wisdom to be contributed from reflections on the millennia of spiritual
writers, it will not translate well through defensiveness. Thus, I trust
the reader to treat my narrative with respect, or to skip on to another
article.
Let me also repeat a plea for mystery. Not for magic, or raw
superstition or simple anti-rationalism-but for something like intui-
tion, which allows our busy minds after all their genuinely necessary
machinations, to be found by truth which yields insights but never
stays. This is a call echoed in William Brennan's herald to reunite
head and heart. 34 Even the courts below talk directly about what is
"undefined, and perhaps undefinable" by the, general codes. They re-
turn to "ancient" and "sacred" rights and the "living spirit" which is
the "force" of "the body politic." These references are to the idea of
the "vitality" of the "genius of our government," and specifically to
"the law of the land."
There are long histories of "the law of the land," Magna Carta's
legem terrae, and yet it is ultimately mysterious.35 It is in these state
31. Id. at 87.
32. Id. at 88.
33. A. Simpleman (a.k.a P.R. Teachout), Sentimental Metaphors, review of M.S. BALL,
LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY, 34 UCLA L. REV. 537
(1986).
34. W.J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, And 'The Progress Of The Law, 42#8 REC
ABNYC 948 (1988); also see H. NOUWEN, LIFESIGNS: INTIMACY, FECUNDITY AND ECSTASY
IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE (1986); S. MOORE, LET THIS MIND BE IN You (1985); Scales,
The Emergence of a Feminist Jurisprudence, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986); Fraser, What's Love
Got To Do With It? CLS, Feminist Discourse, and an Ethic of Solidarity, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 53 (1988); Cornell, Post-Structuralism, the Ethical Relation, and the Law, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1587 (1988).
35. See Jurrow, Untimely Thoughts, XIX AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 265
(1975); Berger, Law of the Land Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1(1979); Law of the Land, 3
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courts' accounts, a living, creative spirit that gives life to the polity,
yet it is both written and unwritable. Like Robert Cover's nomos, it
sits in the is and stretches towards the ought.3 6 It is the Heraclitean
stuff of becoming. The spirit gives life to the letter.
None of this makes it nonsense. But the side of the paradox of
the written and unwritten law of the land which is never fully tran-
scribed, is what reminds us to be humble, even to the point of
prayerfulness. The attitude of the reader of a constitution must ulti-
mately be faithful, not merely to self, but to text and nomos. The
result is not automatic. The wonderful labyrinth of belief/creed, sa-
cred/secular, law/religion is explored profoundly by Sanford Levin-
son in Constitutional Faith, but even he must leave us unresolved.37
He tells us he will sign and endorse the United States Constitution,
but it takes an entire book of weighty (and witty) reflection to tell us
one person's story of what that means. We can tell stories and attend
to the text, but even the black-robed state justices know that the story
is never finished; the definitive text is never written; mystery remains,
and each person must bring life to it.
The texture of this discussion of the letter and spirit of the law is
from state constitutional decisions. The core is eight cases from seven
different states, from the 19th century. The language on which this
discussion of state cases centers, emerges as more common in nine-
teenth century judicial discussion than in today's. The article pro-
poses that this somewhat unfamiliar language from the states' pasts,
points us to the future throughout the republic. It offers both a reju-
venation of the nomos of the law of this land and a focus for the de-
centralization called for by critics from Supreme Court dissenters and
Richard Epstein, to Mark Tushnet. 38
It would be strange if we could conceive of a reconstructed vision
of American law without touching the times and texts in which the
old faith was honored. These old stories and the ease with which they
incorporated the sacred in the law, provide us with echoes of a spirit
of the law that is at once incarnated in time and transcending it. The
sentiments of the older cases remind us of something that they in-
voked at the same time they attempted to embody it. We cannot give
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1130; C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE
LAND (1980).
36. Cover, supra note 13.
37. S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
38. Tushnet, Federalism and the Traditions ofAmerican Political Theory, 19 GA. L. REV.
981 (1985); Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, J. LEGAL ED. (1986); Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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substance to exactly the same spirit or vitality, but the deeper reality
that the cases invoke promises to begin to bridge toward the perpetu-
ally unattained "ought" of the law. From one vantage, we see the
warm Heraclitean flux forming patterns in the spirit's tracings; from
another, we see the Platonic form of the Good glimpsed in its crystal-
line unity. The "point of intersection of the timeless with time" is
both momentary and eternal, both essential and practical, and the in-
teraction of seeming opposites makes the deepest sense yet none at
all.39 Our discourse is T.S. Eliot's "raid on the inarticulate with
shabby equipment always deteriorating,"' but it is an attempt at lib-
eration from mordant legalism.4" The oldest of the specifically Chris-
tian sacred texts (and much of Jewish holy literature) and of major
world religions combine in pointing to a turn of mind and heart from
the trap of mere letter.42 This "post-modern" cast of thought is also
echoed in feminist writings, both theist and ostensibly secular. If the
theologians and feminists are correct that human nature is potentially
more expansive than humanity has yet owned, this new turn is a full,
fertile sphere. It moves first away from current rational conventional
thinking, and then moves back, enriched by its journey. It undergoes,
in the image of theologian John Dunne, the transformation created by
passing over and return.43 It is both exodus and regathering, both
leaving and claiming. It is, in Eliot's words, returning to where we
started but knowing the place for the first time." It is a dance of
alternation, of letting go, reclaiming, leaving, coming back, reforging,
and knowing that time to let go will come again.
The observers of the law are not unaware of this time to turn.
Arthur Leff, dry, witty, never before affirming, proclaimed the time
soon before his death.4" Robert Cover became doctrinally and poeti-
cally prophetic, announcing the law as Word and Deed, as Violence,
as born (and dying) in nomos.46 The turning has begun: this article is
39. See discussions of "paradoxical logic" in J. BENJAMIN, BONDS OF LOVE (1988); S.
MOORE, LET THIS MIND BE IN YOU (1985); P. RICOEUR, E.G., HISTORY AND TRUTH 21-81
(1965).
40. T.S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvages" V, "East Coker" V, from The Four Quartets, COL-
LECTED POEMS 1909-1962 198, 189 (1963).
41. L. FULLER, THE LAW IN OUEST OF ITSELF 77-84 (1940); J. VINING, THE AUTHORI-
TATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 187 (1986); J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS AND
POLITICAL TRIALS (1964).
42. R.S. CHOPP, THE PRAXIS OF SUFFERING (1986); M. ELLIS, TOWARD A JEWISH THE-
OLOGY OF LIBERATION (1987); C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1947).
43. J. DUNNE, THE HOUSE OF WISDOM (1986).
44. Eliot, supra note 40, at 209.
45. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 79 DUKE L.J. 1229 (1979).
46. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation of the Word, the Deed, and the Role,
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intended as one more song of change. The words of the chorus to the
song of change are familiar yet demanding: the spirit in (and not
abolishing) the letter, the meaning in (and not abandoning) the text,
the sacred in the technical, the living soul of constitution in the literal
reading, the power of the people in the document's words, the author-
ity emanating from the people rather than mere political theory, the
habits of life of the people rather than unguarded words, the power of
those things too plain to be written over the tyranny of text, the living
and breathing spirit of a land and its fundamental law, over the life-
less skeleton of mere express words of a written constitution. The
words of this version of the chorus come directly from state constitu-
tional decisions spanning a sixty year period before the post-Warren-
Court squabbles over theories of interpretation.
The reader may not agree with the voice identified in this chorus
about the law of the land; I claim only to remind the reader of the
voice, and to let the song sing in the reader's mind. It is not the only
chorus during those sixty years, but I do claim that it may be the most
potent voice that can now call us to life as a people. It is grounded in
the people, close to them as only their state commonwealths could be,
and it is as ancient as the voice that existed before but burst forth
dramatically in Magna Carta. It is the law of the land singing in her
people, even from the pens of the white male aristocrats of the nascent
American meritocracy. Its colonial singers did not live the full extent
of its truth, did not conceive of human nature being human rather
than Anglo masculine, but it is still a song of promising integrity. It
contains the seeds of reconciliation with the song as it will sing today.
It is an invitation to us now, as we consider, in our rapidly mutating
federal system in a North-South world, what we can say about human
rights and the rule of law, to begin the reconstitution of the law of the
land, at the level at which that- law first started-state constitutions.
III. THE STATE CASES
When the United States Constitution was drafted, the states al-
ready had constitutions, many of considerable eloquence. For reasons
which may defy dry historical analysis, the state constitutions initially
grounded their most basic rights on deference to "the law of the
land," rather than "due process."47 The federal document had no ini-
20 GA. L. REV. 815 (1986); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE. L.J. 1601 (1986), Cover,
Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
47. Berger, supra note 35, at 1; McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14
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tial mention of this notion, and the amendment which gave it eventual
life chose the "other" version of this grounding concept, due process
of law. This choice for the "process" phrase, which still spread the
core notion beyond criminal law, created a dangerous ally for dry
proceduralism.48
Although early in English jurisprudence, Sir Edward Coke made
a statement that seemed to run "the law of the land" together with
"due process of law,"'49 the two are not the same (or their sameness
obscures the substantive nature of Coke's and Magna Carta's "due
process"). This is true in history and on the face of things, in the
ordinary meaning of the words-something that my State Constitu-
tional Law students insisted upon strongly enough to get my atten-
tion. I would argue, with all due disclaimers about knowing
absolutes, that it is also true in the reality of the law. "The law of the
land" refers to something fundamental, something inexhaustible,
something almost premoral, something ancient, sacred and ultimately
ineffable, about the law of this country."° Ultimately, it also points to
our first mother country, her progenitors, and, I would argue, all of
humankind (but that part of-the journey can only be mentioned here).
What can be traced is the continued narrative of the rights that
traveled to the new world and gave birth to states and eventually to a
Union. The search of the early Americans was for "a more perfect
Union." They strove to come together in a country, after they had
more basically succeeded in coming together as individual states. The
greatest growth of that country came through and after the greatest
civil disunion among the states. The legacy of American law suggests
that in our current new Federalism is a call for hope in the face of a
deep struggle that promises a deeper union. The tension, as in theolo-
gies, is between the one and the many. This article's song will be from
the voices of the many, hoping to discern the chorus which makes us
one. It claims that we have the wisdom for community in us already.
We have said it, but forgotten it. We can expect to relearn it only by
COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1914); Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War,
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911).
48. See Rogge, Concept of Ordered Liberty, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 238 (1959); A. HOWARD,
THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA
(1968).
49. Berger, supra note 35; Rogge, supra note 48.
50. Supra note 35; R. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926); C.H. MCILWAIN, CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN (1958); J.G.A. POCOCKE, THE ANCIENT CONSTITU-
TION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1957).
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returning to the places we left-the state communities and common-
wealths-and knowing them anew.
Of the eight basic state cases, two spawned same-state compan-
ions during the course of the research, and the latecomers were never
driven off, so that the total is ten. Each (but two) is before the high-
est state court (the Tennessee case involves a special court, the person-
nel of which included a supreme court justice, as the substance of the
case notes). In the Michigan case, People v. Hurlbut (1871),"' some of
the most striking language is by Justice Cooley, but the other judges
are not remarkably well-known even within their own states. The elo-
quence of the opinions comes more from the strength of the vision
itself to which they give words, than from the peculiar endowments of
the sitting judge.
All cases arose in the nineteenth century. From Bank of the
State v. Cooper,52 an 1831 case, to the cases in the last decade of the
century, they span seventy years, and straddle the Civil War. Four
including Bank v. Cooper predate the tearing of the country: Saco v.
Wentworth (1853), 53 Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams
(1838)," 4 and Billings v. Hall (1856)."
Hurlbut, and the remaining four followed the conflict between
the states by at least a few years: State v. Doherty (1872),56 Atchison &
Nebraska R.R. Co. v. Baty (1877), 57 Rathbone v. Wirth (1896)," and
State v. Moores (1898)." The temporal spread of the cases is impor-
tant because of the enactment of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, July 9, 1868, containing the most impor-
tant use of the language of "due process" in American jurisprudence.
The dates of the cases are also well beyond the period canvassed
by Professor Sherry in her work on constitutional interpretation,60
and Thomas Grey's survey of pre-1789 legal work.61 Sherry's analysis
focused on the early jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court and of state courts, demonstrating that at the time of the foun-
51. 24 Mich. 44.
52. 10 Tenn (2 Yer.) 599.
53. 37 Me. 171.
54. 9 G& J 365.
55. 7 Cal 1.
56. 60 Me. 509.
57. 6 Neb. 37.
58. 150 N.Y. 459.
59. 55 Neb. 480.
60. Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1127 (1987).
61. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu-
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 852 (1978).
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ders the conception of law included multiple sources of fundamental
law, of which a written constitution was only one. The eighteenth
century state courts uniformly refused to confine their constitutions to
"express constitutional provision" but, as Sherry notes,
... there is no case during this period in which the courts have
upheld an act contrary to natural law on the ground that the law
was not in conflict with any constitutional provision.62
Sherry concludes that the fundamental law at the time of the United
States Constitution consisted of a "a mixture of custom, natural law,
religious law, enacted law, and reason. '"63
This tradition of a more generous idea of fundamental law con-
tinued in the state courts even after the period in which the United
States Supreme Court backed away from overt natural law or funda-
mental law language. Marshall moved from an explicitly natural or
eternal law grounding to language supposedly confining his authority
to parsing the express language of the written constitution, during the
cases between 1810 and 1819. Even David Currie, who argues that
natural law played almost no role in United States judicial thought,
acknowledges that Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 64 relied on
"unwritten limitations" to legislative power.65 But subsequent cases
saw a cleansing of such references to the unwritten, higher law at the
national court level. Not so at the state level, which continued to
operate in a richer soil, less dictated by the dry doctrinal winds that
drove Marshall to supposedly pure textualism.
As Sherry notes, the adherence to textualism by the United
States Court has continued even when to link decisions to specific
clauses "stretches the language to the limits of credibility."66 The ap-
parent need to appear to rest decisions on positive law has not re-
stricted the free play of judicial politics; proponents of all political
positions and judicial philosophies have found some set of cases re-
pugnant despite their interpretive basis, since positivism captured the
vocabulary of the Court.67 Debates about indeterminacy continue,
and a look at the periodical indices shows the ingenuity with which
scholars and judges have attempted to provide a theory of interpreta-
62. Sherry, supra note 60, at 1167.
63. Id. at 1129.
64. 10 US (6 Cranch) 87.
65. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Power, 1801-
1835, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 887, 892-894 (1982).
66. Sherry, supra note 60, at 1176.
67. See Note, The Partisan Battle Over the Constitution: Meese's Jurisprudence of Original
Intention, and Brennan's Theory of Contemporary Ratification, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 389 (1987).
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tion to refute, to urge, or to transcend textual indeterminacy.
Supreme Court decisions have become too often a morass of foot-
notes, shattered stare decisis, unintelligible technicalities and dialogic
gridlock.
Although there are two main clusters of subject matter among
the state cases (appointment of "local officials" and takings of prop-
erty) they also treat topics such as state corporations, wandering live-
stock, and the selling of spirituous liquors. The variety of subject
matter indicates the pervasiveness of the notion of law of the land in
state courts. The cases sometimes cite one another, and sometimes
refer to the same learned treatises, but rarely refer to federal courts,
lower or Supreme.
Three of the cases deal with local government. In State v.
Moores, the Nebraska legislature's act of 1897 regulating the govern-
ment of metropolitan cities was attacked. The category of "metropol-
itan class" cities was exhausted by the city of Omaha, at a time when
the partisan politics between the state legislature and big-city Omaha
underlay a good deal of the controversy. The legislation provided,
among other things, that the governor was to appoint police and fire
commissioners for Omaha. The mayor and a majority of the city
council of Omaha proceeded to assume control of the police and fire
departments, ignoring the governor's appointed commissioners, and
bringing a quo warranto action in the state supreme court. The Ne-
braska constitution held no express provisions delegating to local
units of government the power to select their officers or manage their
own affairs. The court noted that there was also no express prohibi-
tion against the governor's appointment of officials to control "purely
local affairs."6
Any such prohibition against the governor in Lincoln running
Omaha arose because a law allowing him or her to do so "is repug-
nant to some right retained by the people at the time of the adoption
of the organic law."69 The court found that retained right.. The
Moores court found that local government was at the center of the
American idea of government, and that "the mind revolts" at the de-
nial of the people's right to self-government which such an "undemo-
cratic" scheme would violate. 0°
The case most extensively cited by the Moores court was People v.
68. Moores, 55 Neb. at 489.
69. Id. at 489.
70. Id. at 521.
[Vol. 6
CALLING THE LETTER TO LIFE
Hurlbut,7" including sitting Justice Cooley's original commentary.
Hurlbut centered around a provision of the Michigan constitution
that "Officers of cities and villages shall 6 e elected at such times and
in such manner as the legislature may direct."72 In Michigan, the first
water, police and fire commissioners were appointed by the legislature
of the state. However, in 1871, after the initial seventeen years of the
state constitution, the Detroit water and sewer commissioners were
served with writs calling them to show by what authority they contin-
ued to exercise their offices. The struggle over Detroit's local govern-
ance came to a head with the 1871 act which provided for the state
legislature's appointment of permanent officers within the city govern-
ment of Detroit. Cooley replied that this blow "aimed at the founda-
tion of our structure of liberty," compelled the court's defense of the
"plainest and most primary axioms of free government"73 because the
direction of the history of constitutional struggles against tyranny,
was "toward popularizing authority". 4 The state could not run the
major city directly, but could only direct how local elections were to
be conducted.
In- New York the legislature tried to control a city closer to
home-Albany. The control was more indirect. The legislature
passed an act which set out in excruciating detail how the police com-
missioners were to be elected, including provisions that not more than
two of the four commissioners were to be of the same political party,
that the council should meet at eight o'clock on a first Monday, that
the quorum would be those who attend, that the council should not
transact any other business until the commissioner were elected, and
more.75 The main attack on the act was the restriction on partisan
composition, but the court used a broader principle in rejecting the
entire scheme as violating the right of local self-government, which
was both fundamental and necessary for its educational and formative
effect upon the citizen.76 The dissent said that the majority should
have picked and chosen among the provisions of the act in order to
preserve its constitutionality, arguing that the key eligibility provision
(the appointee must belong to the party have the first or second high-
est number of representatives on the council) could be jettisoned leav-
ing the rest of the act acceptable. The majority concluded that the
71. Hurlbut, supra note 51.
72. Id. at 47.
73. Id. at 109.
74. Id. at 110.
75. Rathbone, 150 N.Y. at 460.
76. Id. at 467.
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legislature had no business setting partisan or detailed restrictions on
local procedures.
Aside from the local government cases and the property cases
treated below, the bulk of the ten cases covered a range of issues. The
two Maine cases were matters of small-gauge procedure; the Tennes-
see case was a special court composed for defaulters on loans from the
state bank; the Maryland case was a complicated discussion of corpo-
rate charters. Two key cases, Taylor v. Porter and Billings v. Hall
concerned property rights.
The Billings case is representative of the treatment of property in
the core and secondary analysis of all the cases. It found property to
be an inalienable right, but one co-existing with unchangeable ideas of
natural justice which were founded in and definitive of community
(see Section IV below). In March, 1856, the California legislature
passed "an Act for the protection of actual settlers, and to quiet land-
titles in this State." Under that version of a succession of bills dealing
with who owned land in the territory which moved from Mexican
possession to American with many disputes about when and if pre-
incorporation title or post-incorporation possession prevailed, an
owner who successfully ejected an occupant, owed the occupant the
value of any improvements. The California Court at first found all
suits by nonoccupant title claimants illegal. After the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed that tactic, the Court knew such suits were still very
unpopular. The plaintiff, Billings, claimed that he had title from John
A. Sutter, who was granted the land by the Mexican government.
This grant was decreed confirmed by the Board of U.S. Land Com-
missioners. Although the ejected Hall prevailed under the Act, the
California court overturned that directed verdict. It concluded that
the law imposed, as a condition of the recovery of property, payment
for improvements (without recovery of rent) for the five years of ad-
verse possession; such an imposition was a taking without just com-
pensation. The court noted that much of the prejudice against
ejectments came from widespread fraud, but that this case had no
such fraud. Thus the court could not allow taking from "early pio-
neers the honest acquisition of toil and danger to enrich needy adven-
turers, upon the shallow pretext of policy, and under the false
assumption of legislative omnipotence."77
77. Billings, 7 Cal. at 16.
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IV. THE CASES' SONG: BEYOND WORDS, IN THE PEOPLE
The state benches in the 19th century are not intimidated by the
federalized legal discourse soon to eclipse much state court thought.78
They speak with a clarity that the United States Supreme Court has
lost in its decades of convoluted internecine and political twists of
doctrine. They evince a simplicity that is not unsophisticated, and are
unafraid to return to the roots of constitutional thought. They em-
ploy a directness that ties their reasoning to the people from whom
they recall that their power emerges and that remains comprehensible
to those people.
Within the opinions, there are revolutionary thoughts. Usually
cautious justices range beyond cramped legal language. Cooley asks
"... but what is constitutional freedom?" and answers with a striking
rejection of defensive, negative liberties:
Constitutional freedom certainly does not consist in exemption
from governmental interference in the citizen's private affairs; in
his being unmolested in his family, suffered to buy, sell, and enjoy
property, and generally to seek happiness in his own way. All
might be permitted by the most arbitrary ruler .. .
Rather than confining constitutional freedom to the right to be left
alone, he finds that there is something about constitutional freedom,
which we find "in usages, customs, maxims" which "have sprung
from the habits of life, modes of thought," which also generates "rev-
olutions which have overturned tyrannies." This something is the
constitution's "living spirit, that which gives it force and attraction,
which makes it valuable" and which creates the allegiance of the peo-
ple, the foundation of the legitimacy of the state.8°
The "living spirit" is, finally, beyond expression. The contrast
that the cases make with the "mere words" and the letter of the law,
is the ineffable, that which cannot be said. It is like the apophatic
notion of God, the via negativa, the path to the Ultimate by way of
what God is not. The spirit taps a fountain of fundamental law that is
written on the human heart, or at least, according to Lon Fuller,
found in the customs, agreements, reason and coercive power of
human society. 8' This fundamental law is the "Higher Law" of
78. Douglas, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 128, 131-35 (1988); State
v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, at 235 (1985).
79. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 106.
80. Id. at 107.
81. Fuller, supra note 41, at 79.
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Corwin, 2 the "unwritten constitution" of Sherry and Grey, and prob-
ably the birthplace of penumbras. (The translation of this living spirit
into present law is, of course, a fallible process. Not all poetry is good
poetry, or true.) Long before Justice Douglas and the controversy
over the right of privacy, Cooley found that there was an emergent
right to local government, "some system of localized authority ema-
nating from the people."-
8 3
The fundamental law exists in the people, but needs the medium
of judicial interpretation, to bring it to words. The reason that such
power of self-governance must emanate from the unwritten is that
"[s]ome things are too plain to be written." 4 More fundamentally
yet, such basic threads of society are natural and inherent, and elude
definition. Inherent rights cannot be given away, nor claimed by soci-
ety, yet these immutable political realities are "undefined and perhaps
undefinable by any general code." 5 New York had no bill of rights in
its constitution: "The enumeration was designedly omitted, because
unnecessary and tended to weaken, if not endanger, those unno-
ticed."'8 6 Cooley remarked that the reason that the lack of grounding
in an express written provision was far from fatal, was that such a
mechanic of interpretation and drafting would make it necessary to
point out to "the protesting people" how they gave away what they
thought they retained, "to point out to them where and by what un-
guarded words the power had been conferred."8 " Rather than af-
firming a model of constitutional drafting that made such an
enterprise an inherently dangerous activity, a game in which if the
people's representatives forgot to say (or failed to imagine) the correct
incantation, their unguarded words gave away rights, Cooley ac-
knowledged the realm of the power of the unspoken. He sang praise
of constitutional command that went beyond and underlay the writ-
ten instrument:
Some things are too plain to be written. If this charter of state
government, which we call a constitution, were all there was of
constitutional command; if the usages, the customs, the maxims,
that have sprung from the habits of life, modes of thought, meth-
ods of trying facts by the neighborhood, and mutual responsibility
in neighborhood interests, the precepts which have come from the
82. Corwin, Higher Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928).
83. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 90.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Moores, 55 Neb. at 489.
86. Id. at 493, quoting People v. Morris, 13 Wend. (N.Y.) 325.
87. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 106-07.
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revolutions which overturned tyrannies, the sentiments of [manly]
independence and self control which impelled our ancestors to
summon the local communities to redress local evils, instead of re-
lying upon king or legislature to do so-if a recognition of all these
were to be stricken from the body of our constitutional law, a life-
less skeleton might remain, but the living spirit, that which gives it
force and attraction, which makes it valuable and draws to it the
affections of the people....
He concludes that without this spirit, our constitutions would be no
better than the "numberless constitutions so called which in Europe
had arisen and failed," despite their seeming "equally fair and to pos-
sess equal promise with ours".8 9 They failed; our notion of constitu-
tion succeeds because ours is "not wanting in the support and vitality
which these [usages, customs, maxims, living spirit] alone can give-
this living and breathing spirit, which supplies the interpretation of
the words of the written charter. .."90
This spirit, inherent in the people, precedes and expands beyond
the legitimate state. It stretches past the stable times, and finds voice
in "the precepts which have come from the revolutions" overthrowing
tyrannies. The constitution, in this image, is pre-political. It grows,
in any single version, from a living ground on which any polity rests;
the ground is both dynamic and final. It throws up maxims in differ-
ent times and circumstances, but it also stays the same, the silent
source of the underlying harmonies of the people of the land. The
constitution, "Instead of being the source of our laws and liberties [is]
... no more than a recognition and re-enactment of an accepted sys-
tem ... of ancient rights", Chief Justice Campbell observes in Hurl-
but.91 The "accepted system" is no single state, no single nation. It is
something which is accepted, known-yet never known and always in
dispute. The basis, the ground of the fundamental law cannot be cap-
tured or exhausted in words.
The origins and story of "per legem terrae," of "the law of the
land," first used prominently in Magna Carta, show that it intends
beyond the law of any single tradition despite its obvious talismanic
role in English history. Hamilton, in arguing in Ruthers v. Wad-
dington, a 1784 New York case, 92 ran together "the law of the land,"
"the law of nations," and "Universal Society." The basic law to which
88. Id. at 107.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 87.
92. Goebel, Law and Practice at 289, cited in Sherry.
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Hamilton referred was that of (right) reason, of human nature, of all
lands, in his discussion. The painful fact that human nature really
referred to white landowning Anglo-Saxon males, was not a gov-
erning fact in Hamilton's consciousness. This lofty aspect of founding
spirit, not its inherent finitude, is the source of the law of the land.
Despite its universal and transcendent aim, its only life on earth oc-
curs through individual minds even as they may engage in communal
dialogue and occasional documents,93 in real societies. It is an ideal
as both ground and aim, never fully brought into reality, always
sensed as existing but seen only through a glass partially. It does not
matter whether it is a Platonic form or a nominalist vanishing point-
never attained, always desired, it is in the realm of ideals of justice,
which persists and is reborn in human imagination. Whether abso-
lute, utopian or merely transformative, it is a spirit of law which ju-
rists regularly identified as existing even before Magna Carta, existing
always and increasingly closely approximated in human constitu-
tions.94 The contemporary need for a jurisprudence, a political the-
ory, a theology of law, justice and human nature combined, is evident
in the books and commentary on law. From John Rawls' A Theory of
Justice9 5 in the early 1970's to the present, commentary has expanded
from narrow discourse within the tradition of philosophical liber-
alism, to include feminist, Marxist, socialist, traditional conservative,
libertarian, anarchist and communitarian visions, as well as elabora-
tions and new justifications for philosophical liberalism. The increase
in scope has accompanied an increase in depth of reflection. Beyond
deconstruction, attempts at reconstruction have begun. Not surpris-
ingly, reconstruction centers first on the individual; the edited Recon-
structing Individualism 96 contains a remarkable display of individual
calls to move beyond skepticism, from Stanley Cavell's elegant con-
clusion that one must take responsibility to mean, or not to mean,
through Martha Nussbaum's dangerously personal love-and-virtue
narrative, to the internally Christian monologue of Paolo Valesio.
Roberto Unger's Passion 9 7 is an attempt to portray the personal as
prelude to the political, although Michael Perry is disappointed at
Unger's failure to be truly personal. Perry calls for us to risk "elabo-
rating and defending a substantial and concrete vision of what it
93. See Joel Handler, "Dependent People, the State and the Modern/Postmodern Search
for the Dialogic Community," Institute for Legal Studies (Madison, WI) (SPR-19).
94. Sherry, supra note 60, at 1137-38.
95. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
96. Heller, Sosna and Wellbery eds. (1986).
97. Supra note 12.
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means to be human. ' 98 Perry says that such questions as what it
means to be authentically human are much too determinative of one's
politics to be privatized, as secular leftists have done. Perry echoes
Alasdair Maclntyre's call for a politics of virtue, a call heard on the
left from commentators like Stanley Hauerwas. 99 The at-least-one
bright spot for the otherwise dim vista of political-moral thought,
Perry concludes, comes from feminist thought."° This theme, the
feminine as illuminating the human, and the human as crucial to the
political (and thus legal), is to continuing concern of this essay.
Key to the image of the human in these cases are two insistent
themes, the ascendancy of the spirit of the law and the genesis of
power (of spirit) in the people prior to their political institutions. The
image of the prepolitical people who are not extinguished by the ad-
vent of the state, is not the Hobbesean state of nature but the Lock-
ean. One case gives the actual discourse from Locke. The California
supreme court, in Billings v. Hall (1857) discusses theories of legisla-
tive power, and decides for "the plainest principles of morality and
justice" and the spirit as well as the letter of the constitution, in af-
firming Locke's stance on the public good and the inability of a person
to give that away. That is, no one can transfer to another more power
than she has in herself, and nobody has an absolute, arbitrary power
over himself or any other. Locke's reasoning, adopted in Billings, is
that there is no such power in any legitimate form, but only power
that has the end of preservation; there is no such right as a right "to
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subject".,0° There
are thus rights that are inalienable because they are the very rights
that one left the state of nature to ensure, and rights that are inaliena-
ble because they were never "rights" at all.
Michael Sandel has suggested, consistent with Locke's notion of
the self as property, that some rights are inalienable because they con-
stitute part of the core being of the person. 102 Those c6re values and
beliefs are embedded in the person, and are lived through the spirit.
The 19th century cases assume that somehow those constitutive be-
liefs are part of the human nature, of spirit in each and in all.
For both negative and positive rights, "the law of nature stands
98. 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 589, 590 (1987).
99. S. HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER (1981); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIR-
TUE (1981).
100. Perry, supra note 5, at 591.
101. Billings, 7 Cal. at 12.
102. Michael Sandel, "The Crisis of Liberal Political Theory," Williamsburg Charter,
supra note 24, at 36-41 (1988).
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as an eternal rule to all." ' 3 Negative, destructive rights cannot be-
long to the sovereign for there are no such rights; affirmative rights
remain with the people, because in entering society to protect those
rights, the people do not make a self-negating or spirit-destroying
compact but a compact for the social good. The prepolitical rights
are visible through and in the institutions of legitimate government.
The "principles of natural justice" stand above the sovereignty of the
legislature. "
The necessarily static court opinions recognize sovereignty in the
people. Under our form of government, they observe, the Legislature
is not supreme. It is only one of the "organs of that absolute sover-
eignty which resides in the whole body of the people .. ."105 The
fundamental shape of our polity is inherent in this law-within-the-
people. Billings resounds with choruses of "law and reason" and
"natural justice"' 6 and ties "inalienable rights" to both "the plainest
principles of justice and morality" and to Magna Carta. These natu-
ral law ideas are among "those fundamental principles of enlightened
government, lying at "the foundation of every constitutional govern-
ment and ...necessary to the existence of civil liberty and free
institutions."
The depth of fundamental law tapped in Billings is thus as deep
as human nature and as long ago as before Magna Carta.
According to the 17th-century myth, a myth later fully embraced
by the American Whigs, the origins of these fundamental unwrit-
ten laws themselves were buried beyond recovery in the Saxon
past. 1
07
The history and the home of the law of the land is in the people. It
shines in "the genius and spirit of all our institutions".1
0 8
The power of the fundamental law does not lie leaden in the peo-
ple. The "absolute sovereignty which resides in the whole body of the
people''  is *a generative force which comes to words at different
times in history, emerging in different voices attuned to the times.
The "pre-existing rule of conduct" that "law of the land" and "due
process" denote, arises into written form as a constitution, as "no
103. Billings, 7 Cal. at 12 (quoting John Locke).
104. Id. at 13.
105. Billings, 7 Cal. at 14.
106. Id. at 8-15.
107. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu-
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 852 (1978).
108. Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G & J 365, 412 (1838).
109. Baty, 6 Neb. at 43.
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more than a recognition and reenactment"' 0 of "ancient rights" al-
ready known. The Nebraska court in 1877 taps the "ancient law" and
"sacred shield" which is a "fundamental principle lying beneath and
behind all edicts, constitutions, and statutory law."' The Baty court
specifically rejects the notion that the constitution is the "origin of
rights, [or] the fountain of law"; rather, it is the framework of govern-
ment, "necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws,
rights, habits and modes of thought.""' 2 It affirms Webster's state-
ment that "written constitutions sanctify and confirm great principles,
but the latter are prior in existence to the former." 3 If a legislative
provision conflicts with this underlying set of laws, rights, habits and
thoughts, then it is not the law of the land, and is void." 4
The "fundamental principle of right and justice" that is "inher-
ent in the nature and spirit of the social compact" and the causes and
purposes of the genius of our government, "rises above" the power of
legislation, according to the Court of Appeals in Regents v. Williams
(1838). That fundamental basis of justice and right is "independent of
[the United States Constitution] and of any express restrictions in the
constitution of the state.""' 5 The ground of fundamental justice is
outside time, independent of time and place, both coming before and
rising above. It is the truth that is "recognition and re-enactment"
when given words, but that finally rests in the unspeakable. The fun-
damental law follows the rhythms of history, alternating silence and
voice, calling for naming yet always eluding it. This basic law always
offers freedom, openness to new life for the law as lived and applied in
the courts. Like Eliot's moment in and out of time, when the funda-
mental law is summoned, "history is now and England"'" 6 (or even
Nebraska). It is immediate and elusive, said but never fully spoken.
Such a portrait of the law of the land may evoke the fear that
scripture about God's Spirit may raise in those who consider them-
selves practical and pragmatic. If the Spirit blows where it listeth, do
we want a constitutional jurisprudence that is likewise unfettered?
What is to stop anarchic antinomianism, pure idiosyncratic subjectiv-
ity? Yet undefined judgment, done in good faith, is what commenta-
tors like Philip Soper suggest that is all we can ask of legislators
110. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 87.
111. Baty, 6 Neb. at 41.
112. Id., citing Cooley. Con. Lim., 37.
113. Id. at 41.
114. Cooper, 10 Tenn (2 Yer) at 614.
115. Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G & J 365, 408 (1838).
116. Eliot, supra note 40, at 208.
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anyway. I 7 What assurances, what predictability, what sense of order
can we ask of the law? Is it to be permanent revolution, perpetual
plasticity, or is there a value in stability or comprehensibility that
must be honored?
II8
Recall that the promise in Judeo-Christian scripture is not that
the Spirit will absorb the letter; the invitation is to look for the best
story, the best account of the Law, in following what is ultimately
beyond expression through its illumination of the known and given.
Judges have texts, statutes and precedents as given letter. The letter is
not inherently dead; it is dead if it is wielded without the spirit. The
letter is given, the spirit is present. The combination is what gives life
to the Law through a paradoxical dynamic, an inspiriting of what is
otherwise inert or instrumental, and violent. The cases talk not about
letter as void, but about what joins letter and spirit as valid; the rejec-
tion is of "mere letter", of arid literalism, of "mere forms" or "empty
forms" of law. " I9 Mere words are lifeless, and dead words are deadly.
This spectre of the "dead letter" is not a false conjuring. As sophisti-
cated a commentator as political theorist Don Herzog defends classi-
cal liberalism on the basis that, contrary to CLS views, liberals knew
they were "brandishing" otherwise implausible claims as "political
weapons." Herzog (who is not alone in his fatalism) shows how a
deep cynicism about words can degenerate into a law used but not
inhabited by a people.12o
Neither the cases nor the idea of an unwritten constitution sug-
gest that the level of meaning always beyond reach should run ram-
pant without deference to what has managed to find itself in text.
Sherry and Grey portray multiple sources of fundamental law, with-
out denigrating the seemingly most public, the written constitutional
text. The state cases make clear their reluctance to move beyond pat-
ent textual handholds except for the most rooted values. Scripture
says that the law is written in our hearts, inscribed rather than only
117. P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1986).
118. See 3 R. UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1988).
119. State vs Doherty, 60 Me. 504, 511, (1872). This is not restricted in import to the
Judeo-Christian tradition. As commentators like Ruth Colker and Paul Savoy discuss, other
traditions have a similar notion of legalism. Savoy quotes a Zen commentator:" 'Koans appear
bewildering to people who cherish the letter above the spirit.' " (at 811). Ruth Colker, Review
of Catherine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified, 68 B.U.L. REV. 217 (1988) and Savoy, The
Spiritual Nature of Equality." Natural Principles of Constitutional Law, 28 How. L.J. 809
(1985).
120. Herzog, As Many As Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 609
esp. 625-630 (1987).
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self-transcribing; it says that the law was not to be destroyed but ful-
filled, to the last jot and tittle.
One crux of the relationship between letter and spirit is in the
nature of law. When the state courts talk about this question, they do
not define the term "law" as different from an enacted bill or constitu-
tion, yet they juxtapose legislative action with "law" in the sense of
"true law" or, in their terms, "law of the land." Jurisprudes debate
whether a bad law is no law at all; the state courts find that a law
which is not part of or not consistent with "the law of the land," is
void. In Doherty, the Maine court asks, along with a Pennsylvania
case, what the governing law might be. It concludes that it is "a pre-
existing rule of conduct;" "the law of the land" they note "does not
mean an act of the legislature.
'12 1
If the law is not just any act of the legislature, it is something
more than legislation. Thus, "where it is clear that the legislature has
transcended its authority, it is imperatively required of the courts to
maintain the paramount authority of law." '22 In Baty, the court com-
bined the resistance to legislative supremacy with the foundation of
the civil compact that contained "general permanent law" that was
the law of the land "within the sense of the constitution; general rules
governed society, and "everything which may pass under the form of
an enactment is not therefore to be considered as the law of the land
.* " 123 The "pre-existing rule of conduct" that is signaled by both
"due process of law" and "the law of the land" is to contain every
branch of the government, 124 so the rule does not represent mere judi-
cial supremacy.
The origins of the social compact identify the limits on legislative
power; if the "sacred and inviolable" rights for the protection of
which we enter society could be invaded, then such legislation
... would be at war with the purposes for which the social com-
pact was entered into; and the nature and ends of legislative power,
would furnish no limit to the exercise of it, as it was intended they
should do.' 25
This higher law is the basis for the power of judicial review, limiting
that power at the same time. The legislature, the Williams court
121. Id. at 510.
122. Baty, 6 Neb. at 47.
123. Id. at 43.
124. Id. at 42.
125. Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G & J 365, 409 (1838).
225]
JOURNAL OF LAW& RELIGION
notes, cannot exercise both judicial and legislative powers. Delicately,
the court then declines to assign tyrannical intent:
It is not to be presumed that the legislature can ever have a wish,
or would intentionally abuse or exceed its just powers. But it may
(as it sometimes has done) incautiously and unadvisedly step be-
yond the strict limits of its authority;
12 6
Both court and legislature (as well as executive) can act tyranically.
The animation of the spirit of the law of the land arose from
natural law and a sense of social compact at odds with raw text. The
compact was sometimes conceived to be between person and commu-
nity, but it was not mere contract in part because its final law was in
the body politic. That body was constituted by laws "immutable as
those of nature," laws of "natural justice"."' In an anticipation of
Rawls' original fairness, the Billings court notes that a constitution is
a "solemn compact" entered by a whole people limiting themselves
and their majorities, entered when people "are more free from passion
and prejudice-when no one can foresee whether he will fall with the
majority or with the minority-where there is no interest to subserve,
but equal and exact justice" under "fundamental and external princi-
ples."' 28 Then the citizen's rights are protected not by simple physi-
cal force, but "by the law of the land, and the force of the body
politic."' 29 The sovereignty "resides in the whole body of the peo-
ple". 130 However, this mystical body discomfited the Billings dissent.
Justice Terry finds natural justice "dangerous." He cites Blackstone's
sober denunciation of Locke's notion that final power remains in the
people, because "however just this conclusion may be in theory, we
cannot practically adopt it." "This devolution of power to the people
at large" would be too "desperate," Blackstone concludes, so the
power of the legislature "is absolute and without control."''
Terry's refuge in absolute legislative supremacy is overcome with
legalistic safeguards. It shrinks "the law of the land" to mere cant.
The California constitution's Article 1, section 1, which uses language
akin to the Preamble of the Declaration of Independence ("All men
[sic] are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable
rights")'32 is equated with "a mere reiteration of a truism which is as
126. Id. at 410.
127. Billings, 7 Cal. at 15.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 13.
131. Id. at 20.
132. Id. at 18. Quoting California constitution.
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old as constitutional government."'' 33 This language appears in most
states' constitutions, Terry notes, but is no limitation on the power of
government. If the provision were given credence, it would be "of
dangerous consequence,"'' 34 leaving the laws and constitution at the
mercy of "no fixed rules" but relying instead on "considerations of
policy and public advantage."' 35  Absent "safe and solid" enumera-
tion of prohibitions, the judiciary cannot be left free to exercised "un-
defined" power under ideas of natural justice that are "regulated by
no fixed standard."' 36 Terry concludes that "the ablest and purest"
persons have differed on what natural justice might be, 137 so that the
legislature's decision that the law did not violate fundamental law,
must stand. This interpretivist justice endorses a conclusion in ten-
sion with some of his contemporary kin-the state may take private
property for private purposes, so long as the common good is
served-but his need for rules and clarity is his basis for decision.
The letter is defined, fixed, undangerous, secure.
This security cannot be put at risk, Terry implies. Government
close to the land is very risky. Although Sherry concludes that the
strength of the unwritten constitution is historically greatest in indi-
vidual rights cases, that is not true in state constitutional law in the
19th century. 38 Perhaps the most emphatic and authoritative asser-
tions of the law of the land arise not in the Billings sort of property
rights cases, but around issues of local government.
The Hurlbut case is a microcosm of the theory of participatory
democracy which forms a consistent motif in American political the-
ory. Beginning with English history and moving to Tocqueville and
Jefferson, Cooley chronicles the definitive, generative role of local
government in the states. Local governments "universally, in this
country, were either simultaneous with, or preceded, the more central
authority."'' 39 Not only did a system of local government exist "from
the very earliest settlement of the country, never for a moment sus-
pended or displaced" but also it has been "assumed" and "generally
been supposed" that this system would continue, as the "liberties of
the people ... spring from .. .and [are] dependent upon that sys-




137. Id. at 23.
138. Sherry, supra note 60.
139. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 100.
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tern.' In contrast to the French centralization, our "constitutional
freedom" has, by Tocqueville's lights, depended on localism. Decen-
tralized government is "self-government," which "means everything
for the people and by the people, considered as the totality of organic
institutions, constantly evolving in their character as all organic life is
",141
That local control is a "fundamental principle" of "our general
framework of government," appears to Cooley as "too plain for seri-
ous controversy."' 4 2 From the resistance to the Stuarts in England to
the colonial histories of New England, what Jefferson called "these
little republics" were to be "the main strength of the great one. We
owe to them the vigor given to our revolution, in its commence-
ment." 1 43 In a passage reminiscent of Revolutionary rhetoric, Cooley
recalls Bacon's comparison of a centrally-imposed (monetary) burden
to the same burden arising from local authority: "it may be all one to
the purse, but it worketh diversely on the courage!'"44 Neither letter
nor coin "trumps" spirit, which is locally rooted. In Massachusetts,
Cooley crescendos, "it was even insisted by the people's deputies that,
to surrender local government was contrary to the sixth command-
ment, for, said they, '[persons] may not destroy their political any
more than their natural lives' "u The spirit gives life, and it is
through local government that the people live the law of the land.
In Rathbone, the New York court at the turn of the century ex-
plores the dynamics of local government even more closely. Local
government is a part of "our popular form of government" and of
majority rule, even though majority rule itself is not expressly out-
lined in New York's constitution (as it is not in our national docu-
ment).'46 The basis for local government's seminal place is its
republican placement at the center of citizen participation:
The principle [local government] is one which it takes but little
reflection to convince the mind of being fundamental in our gov-
ernmental system and as contributing strength to the national life,
in its educational and formative effect upon the citizen.
147
The distribution of the opinions in Rathbone reflects the complexity of
140. Id. at 98.
141. Id. at 98-99 (citing Lieber, Civil Liberties & Self-Government, Chapter 21).
142. Id. at 98.
143. Id. at 102.
144. Id. at 102.
145. Id. 101-102.
146. Rathbone, 150 N.Y. at 475.
147. Id. at 467.
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the possible stances on the issues of local government, unwritten con-
stitutional authority, and interpretation of the substantive legislation
under examination. The two majority justices, Gray and O'Brien, dis-
agree on whether there is a written provision of the state constitution
which provides for the sanctity of local government; so do the two
dissenters. One champion of the letter finds that the document clearly
gives literal defense to local control and so is in the majority. One
finds that, lacking any such specific constitutional prohibition, the
challenged law must stand as valid; he dissents. One proponent of the
spirit beyond the mere words perceives that the legislature has vio-
lated the hallowed right to self-determination at the decentralized
level, while the other champion of the meaning beyond the word finds
that the legislation is not a violation of the principle of self-govern-
ment, but is a carrying out of the court's bi-partisan policy, as one of
the controlling provisions of the law at issue required a certain party
mixture at the local level.14 Thus the majority is argued by one letter
advocate and one for the spirit; the same is true on dissent. Given
such a crosscutting set of four opinions, this article can hardly suggest
that stance on the basic issue of the spirit of the law predictably deter-
mines outcome. The focus on spirit in more than one local govern-
ment case, however, suggests that the lack of logically necessary
connection between spirit and localism is not a lack of connection
altogether.
The relationship among the more abstract themes noted above
(localism, legalism) and the extant political circumstances, must re-
main complex. However, it is important to note that the courts are
not ignorant of the role of partisan politics among the more remote
canons of interpretation. Not only does the dissent in Rathbone tap
support for the legislation despite strong affirmation of the spirit of
the lah; in the Moores case, decided in 1898 in Nebraska, the court
explicitly addresses this political subtheme:
It has been asserted, and probably not without foundation, that the
section of the law there under consideration was adopted to give
the party then in power in the state a supposed partisan advantage
in the government of the affairs of the city of Omaha, and it may be
the same motive influenced the adoption of the provision of the law
of 1897 under review.
149
Instead of using a questionable case precedent, the court calls the par-
148. Id. at 506.
149. Moores, 55 Neb. at 520.
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tisan debate by its true name, and proceeds to claim decision upon its
stated rationale:
The denial to the people of the right to govern themselves is un-
democratic, and if such doctrine is enforced, we could no longer
boast of a 'government of the people, for the people, and by the
people.' 1 50
Certainly the incantation of Lincoln's Gettysberg language is not
intended as constitutional justification in the textual sense; it qualifies
as part of the textual canon in Levinson's "Catholic" version of con-
stitutional faith, which believes in continuing revelation, in the accre-
tion of the text through the years.' 5 1 In that interpretive cast, Lincoln
had put into words more of the inchoate level of law, drawing into
words and voicing into tradition, wisdom from the underlying (or
overarching) fund of human pre-knowledge. This is the idea of con-
stitutional "from time immemorial," of fundamental law that was
known in the human heart before Magna Carta and before, which we
are ever struggling to bring into being. It is Cover's notion of Torah,
with a mythic center which creates the bonds of solidarity. Even the
provisions which do make it into words are only one expression of
something more elusive:
The provisions of our Constitution on these subjects, which it is
claimed have been violated ... are, as is well known, but the ex-
pression, in brief and comprehensive language, of general princi-
ples, of remote origin, the development and recognition of which
required centuries of discussion and civil strife before they were
adopted here as the fundamental law. 52
The Rathbone court through O'Brien notes that when meaning and
interpretation of the Constitution comes into play, this evolutionary
history of the written document permits a very wide range of discus-
sion of history, "by means of which principles are traced to their
source and origin, and their progress and application marked, from
time to time, until finally embodied, as they have been, in our written
Constitution."1
53
This writing is not the death of the underlying life of the provi-
sions, not a fixity that sets it in time never to be reinterpreted. Such
basic aspects of the constitution are part of its "political tendency,"
which is "not always to be found expressed in words, but is to be de-
150. Id. at 521.
151. Levinson, supra note 37, at 27ff.
152. Rathbone, 150 N.Y. at 480.
153. Id. at 481.
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rived from acknowledged principles of government that existed long
before its adoption and are to be implied... [my emphasis]."''  This
implication comes from a number of things, including the circum-
stances and historical events which led to the enactment of a particu-
lar provision "as part of the organic law."
A written Constitution must be interpreted as the paramount law
of the land according to its spirit and intent of its framers, as indi-
cated by its terms. 55
In the case at hand, O'Brien concludes that the legislative act "is in
conflict with the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions re-
ferred to and with the fundamental principles of free government."
1 56
O'Brien is not entirely consistent, as several of the other writers
are not, in the style of the justice who says in effect "this is covered by
the words but let me explain just in case why, if you disagree about
the words, either you should have interpreted the words differently
because of the context or you should realize that we don't need the
words to know what everyone knows or we have other words which
resonate enough even though they aren't in the constitution." How-
ever, the fact that he overdetermines his interpretation does not erase
the power of his basic grounding of the decision in the soil of the
localities whose right to govern he is defending. The key to his insis-
tence that it is not necessary to show that the rejection of a law "falls
appropriately within some express written prohibition contained in
the Constitution"' 157 lies with his resistance to the attempts "by the
central authority" to threaten local self-government and "to under-
mine and destroy the spirit of civic freedom,"'5 8 which can only be
nurtured in the loam of the local:
... local self-government, which has always been regarded as fun-
damental in our political institutions, and to be the very essence of
every republican form of government. The local government, even
in the smallest division of the state, is the preparatory school in
which the citizen acquires the rudiments of self-government, and
hence these institutions have been justly regarded as the nurseries
of civil liberty.' 59
This is about participation. In American thought, participation has
stood for the dynamic principle of the public philosophy, for the pro-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 484.
156. Id. at 485.
157. Id. at 483.
158. Id. at 490.
159. Id. at 487.
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cess of governance that both empowers the individual and enriches
the state. 160
The rich potential of the "sense and reality" of local community
in America is narrated for one community (and tied to others through
connected literature) in Carol J. Greenhouse's Praying for Justice.1
6 1
She begins with a notion of Tocqueville's description of the American
dream as a society built not on obedience but on participation' 62 and
concludes by having found what she identified at the outset as
Wittgensteinian view: to see society's heart in its mind. 163 In this
story, the community of Hopewell lives very much by a culture of
what should be done, a set of values known and meant to be honored,
an ought which motivates positively rather than threatens by punish-
ment. If Greenhouse and others with her vision are right, the birth-
place of legitimacy, and of the spirit of the law, is local. The justice
which emerges from this local community's reality is not through un-
derstanding ideas of justice, but by "opening hearts" to the truth.
Religious doctrine is not primarily credal, either, and the tenor and
texture of the lives and hearts and minds of Hopewell's Southern Bap-
tists are not predictable by the stereotype "fundamentalist". The law
that is seen to prevail in Hopewell is that which is written in the heart.
V. THE SPIRIT IN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
Writing in the heart has no definitive text. That is not an arcane
religious obscurantism, but an idea of law eloquently elaborated by
Walter Lippmann over 35 years ago. In The Public Philosophy, Lipp-
mann presaged the current "public philosophy debate" by decades,
with an analysis touching on the classics of Western civilization
(though not necessarily bounded by it). Despite a disconcerting elit-
ism, Lippmann's analysis is radical.' 64 He went directly to Thomas
Aquinas for the idea of a sovereign law of nature "imprinted in the
heart and nature" of the human person. 16 - This law was "spoken
160. See B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE
(1984). One recent rendition of this theme has come, somewhat unexpectedly, from the Amer-
ican Catholic bishops in their pastoral on the economy, Economic Justice for All Pastoral
Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy (1986), Chap. 1.
161. C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER AND COMMUNITY IN AN
AMERICAN TOWN (1986).
162. Id. at 25.
163. Id. at 31.
164. Lippman, supra note 22. For the limits on that radicalism, see Wilson Carey McWil-
liams' discussion of Lippman as philosophical liberal in THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN
AMERICA (1973).
165, Lippman at 77.
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through the mouth of Locke" and other traditions, ideas of philoso-
phers and publicists, ideas which "at times of great stress were com-
mitted to writing, as in the Magna Carta and the Declaration of
Independence."' 16 6 The same basic voice of the law was heard in the
Bill of Rights of 1689 and the United States Bill of Rights.
The largest part of the public philosophy was never explicitly
stated. Being the wisdom of a great society over the generations, it
can never be stated in any single document. 1
67
Lippmann cried that the public philosophy had died, relegated to the
private, submerged in a false accommodation among disagreeing fac-
tions. It was precisely the cordoning off of human beings' most fun-
damental beliefs from the public sphere that eroded the public
structure of ideas and beliefs without which a society cannot endure
as a democracy.
Lippmann never footnoted state constitutional law, or the cita-
tions from Webster or Cooley or even a law review. He had read
neither Bork nor Brennan on interpretation. But he knew with grace-
ful assurance that the law and the republic were in desperate need of
reconnection with The Ultimate.
... philosophy and theology are the ultimate and decisive studies
in which we engage. In them are defined the main characteristics
of the images of man [sic] which will be acted upon . . .168 He
scolds philosophers for keeping us from religion and from the pub-
lic philosophy, by their requirement of "the mastery of human na-
ture in the raw by an acquired rational second nature."' 169 They
have told us that religious experience is purely psychological.
They have robbed us of what Henri Nouwen calls "our first love."
They have failed to hope to find Reality, forgetting that we can
never hold Reality still, never capture it. They have dispirited the
public philosophy. This theme has been rejuvenated across the
political spectrum by Richard John Neuhaus in The Naked Public
Square, Robert Bellah et al. in Habits of the Heart, and George
Will in Statecraft as Soulcraft.17°
Would Lippmann or Will or Bellah have recognized Brother
Juniper? They would have recognized the basic insight that order,
law, public formation, cannot merely be imposed. Juniper mourns:
Somehow . . . the Order was suddenly imposed from without,
166. Id. at 77, quoting Ernest Barker.
167. Id. at 78.
168. Id. at 136.
169. Id. at 136.
170. R.J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1981); R. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF
THE HEART (1985); G. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT (1983).
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whereas before it grew from within, from who we were. Our lives
told us who we were; and then when Francis died, those in author-
ity began to tell us who we were. 1 '
It is not that rules are impossible or totally wrong, or that a public
philosophy is, because it can never be documented or captured in text,
incoherent.
Francis ... took our way of life to Rome to become a rule. Be-
cause he was simple and foolish he got a Rule that remained a way
of life. '72
As Wittgenstein reminds us, to imagine a language means to imagine
a form of life. 173 This is more than a statement of grammar (though
Wittgenstein knows grammar to be theology, and essence); 174 it is a
tale of the death of mere signs.
There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be
filled by the act of understanding. Only in the act of understanding
is it meant that we are to do this. The order-why, that is nothing
but sounds, inkmarks.
- 175
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?-In use it is
alive. Is life breathed into it there?- Or is the use its life?
176
How do sentences do it?-Don't you know? For nothing is
hidden. 177
Yet it is hidden to the postmodern consciousness. We cannot com-
prehend the reality of spirit. The breath of life is the spirit, 1 78 and it is
most visible in the soul, the soul that is of the essence of the human
being. Yet it is not hidden, this soul stuff: "The human body is the
best picture of the human soul. ' 179 Where do we find the center of
the soul, the home of the spirit of the body-Wittgenstein suggests it
is in the heart. 80 The heart is where the law is written.
What is the body of the word without soul or spirit? It is the
corporate body politic devitalized, according to Lippmann. l8 1 His
analysis suggests that the public can become "incandescent" on major
issues for the nation, but that for all other purposes the government
171. Bodo, supra note 28, at 13.
172. Id. at 15.
173. 19, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2nd ed. 1958).




178. G. MAY, SPIRIT & WILL (1983).
179. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (2nd ed., 1958), Part II, iv.
180. Id. Part II, iv.
181. Lippmann, supra note 22, at 29, 34.
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has become the servant of ill-informed public opinion, and has be-
come disjointed from the real flow of events in the world.18 2 Further,
the modern notion that truth is not something dependent upon facts
largely outside human control, has created an intoxication of power
which in Bertrand Russell's words contributes to an increasing danger
of "vast social disaster." ' 3 Lippmann calls for the humility that
modem philosophy has banished, as we turn to face "the mandate of
heaven," and to claim the belief necessary to give life to the public
realm. If the body politic is dormant, if inwardness does not connect
the heart to the outer world, how can the law's public words be used
with integrity, following and infusing spirit, inspiring truth from text?
VI. PRAYER AND INTERPRETATION
There is only "lifeless skeleton" when the "living spirit, that
which gives . . . force and attraction," "vitality", the "living and
breathing spirit which supplies the interpretation of the words" is
missing."8 4 That living spirit has been identified centuries ago as that
which gives interpretation, mediating between gods and humans, tak-
ing the prayers of people to the gods and commands of the gods to the
people. Diotema of Mantineia, the wise woman who was Socrates'
instructress in love (which is at the center of all wisdom and good-
ness, for Socrates), told her pupil about the "great spirit (daimon) ...
intermediate between the divine and the mortal", who "interprets"
between the world and the divine, who "spans the chasm which di-
vides them."' 5 This spirit, this most fundamental interpreter, is
Love.
If it is love that interprets, how do we focus love upon our consti-
tutions? What is the relationship between word, text, and spirit?
We must recover from our spiritual tradition the models and meth-
ods of knowing as an act of love. 186 Words. of prayer are reposito-
ries of the spirit. It is only after we kindle a light in the words that
we are able to behold the riches they contain. It is only after we
arrive within a word that we become aware of the riches our own
souls contain.1
8 7
We pray our constitutions in order to impart spirit into words. We
182. Id. at 23-32.
183. Id. at 135.
184. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 107.
185. THE SYMPOSIUM 202 (Jowett translation, Stephanus edition).
186. P. PALMER, To KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN/A SPIRITUALITY OF EDUCATION 9
(1983).
187. Heschel, supra note 23, at 25.
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participate faithfully in the constitution, embodying and enspiriting it,
in order to give life to the law. Reading is relational, not abstract or
disengaged. Either the patina of disinterest simply reaffirms the status
quo, mindlessly, soullessly, or the interest engages the reader in a
good faith journey through the reality of the words, a journey that
yields true interpretation and must change the reader.
... it is the spiritual power of the praying [person] that makes
manifest what is dormant in the text. The character of the act of
prayer depends on the reciprocal relation between the person and
the word. I8
What Heschel reminds us of is the fact that we do pray texts; that is
what the movement of the mind and soul attending fully to the words
of our community's covenant is-prayer. "Prayer... is an event that
comes to pass between the soul ... and the word."' 89 Interpretation,
rightly done, is prayer.
There are more determinate things to say about interpretation as
prayer. There are also other ways to approach the inwardness of the
act of interpretation as engaging moral goodness. J. Hillis Miller,
longtime leader of the Yale deconstructionists, talks about the "ethi-
cal moment" of attentive reading, which is compelling but under a
law which is not a "written ascertainable law."' 190 Miller's contempo-
rary literary theory is deeply spiritual. However, Heschel is both
deeply and directly so, and resides in the tradition of a "community,
of memory''"" of an actual people. Heschel is drawing on a tradition
rich in both the intricacies of law and the depth of unspeakable cove-
nant. He talks about the polarity of prayer, the way of knowing that
the apparent contradictions of "fixed times, fixed ways, fixed texts" 92
and "worship of the heart, the outpouring of the soul.' 1 93 Although
he finally accords primacy to inwardness (paradoxically, an inward-
ness finally determined by the community of the covenant), he knows
that polarity is an essential trait of all things in reality, and that in
Jewish faith the relationship between halacha (law) and agada (in-
wardness) is one of polarity. '" "Taken abstractly they seem to be
mutually exclusive, yet in actual living they involve each other."' 95
188. Id. at 127.
189. Id. at 27.
190. J. HILLIS MILLER, THE ETHICS OF READING 127 (1987).
191. See Hauerwas, supra note 99.
192. Id. at 64.
193. Id. at 64.
194. Id. at 65.
195. Id. at 65.
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We must remember that judges actually live through their decision-
making, at their best, rather than just going through the motions. If
they do their jobs mechanically they risk that the pole of the static law
overcomes the spirit.
... Jewish prayer is guided by two opposite principles: order and
outburst, regularity and spontaneity, uniformity and individuality,
law and freedom, a duty and a prerogative, empathy and self-ex-
pression, insight and sensitivity, creed and faith, the word and that
which is beyond words.'9 6
The mechanical is mere letter, mere uniformity, mere regularity,
mere creed, mere word. It is the lifeless skeleton of state constitu-
tions. The force of the mere routine word is strong, as Roberto Unger
argues imaginatively in his latest trilogy on politics.' 97 Heschel
agrees:
... the pole of regularity usually proves to be stronger than the
pole of spontaneity, and, as a result, there is a perpetual danger of
prayer becoming a mere habit, a mechanical performance, an exer-
cise in repetitiousness. The fixed pattern and regularity of our
services tends to stifle the spontaneity of devotion.1 98
Prayer can become keva, a fixed thing, without agada (inwardness).
The text of the prayer is from tradition, existing over time. The life of
the prayer comes from kavanah, the inward "creation of a single mo-
ment." 199 And without kavanah (inwardness), Maimonides con-
cludes, prayer is no prayer at all. Without the spirit of the law of the
land, a law is no law at all. If words are not the law of the land, even
if they are the result of the procedures of the legislature they are not
law.
Neither law nor prayer is illusion, so long as the reality is pro-
vided by the living in the words, the inwardness of their invocation.
Letter is present, and reason has participated in the fashioning of the
letter, but the final verity comes from an attitude of the heart. We are
under law's direction, we are under obligation to mitzvah; "a mitzvah
is an act that ought to be done."' But how our actions are animated
makes all the difference. Inwardness concerning the law-directed task
is not, finally, a matter of reason.
196. Id. at 65.
197. R. UNGER, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (Social Theory;
False Necessity; Plasticity Into Power) (1988).
198. Id. at 65.
199. Id. at 66.
200. Id. at 136; Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. LAW &
RELIG. 65 (1988).
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Kavanah is awareness of the will of God rather than awareness of
the reason of a mitzvah. Awareness of symbolic meaning is aware-
ness of a specific idea; kavanah is awareness of an ineffable situa-
tion. It does not try to appropriate what is part of the divine
mystery.2 °1
VII. WORDS AND COMMITMENTS IN THE DARK
Heschel's invocations may be more familiar to the practitioner
and judge than the legal academic, because practice touches on an
attitude to text that is not typical of scholarly word-masters-
humility. Someone who has sent a 14-year-old to a hardened urban
correctional center, who has given a child to one parent rather than
another, who has faced the agonized family of a prisoner at sentenc-
ing, is more likely to know the limitations of mere words in directing
the heart, than someone who has only reflected on all of this. The
scholar may know humility because of life, and words in relation-
ships. She may have discovered Heschel's insight by living:
... we discover the vital truth that speech has power, that words
are commitments.
20 2
But this truth is less likely to have taken residence in the scholar's
heart if he does not know what commitments are, and if he does not
know the reality of mystery, he cannot know commitment.
Commitments are covenants made in the face of mystery.20 a
Commitments are what we need in order to establish binding obliga-
tion, so that the answer to "why should I obey the law?" includes
bond, covenant, mitzvah. Commitments are not solely matters of rea-
son. Here the feminine turn of mind is an advantage. A more telling
argument for this last statement than the literature on women and
mystery, is a query: "What does a single woman in New York do to
get rid of cockroaches?" and its parabolic reply: "She asks them for a
commitment."
Sociologists tell us elaborately what we know if we go to church
or temple in the United States. Places of worship are filled with wo-
men. Women know how to pray. They know the values of the heart.
They know how to live text. Yet it is men who have had the heart to
venture into the world of public text, of text and power, text and vio-
lence. To learn to interpret, we as a society will have to learn Di-
201. Id. at 137.
202. Id. at 25.
203. C. OCHS, AN ASCENT TO Joy: TRANSFORMING DEADNESS OF SPIRIT (1986).
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otema's insight. We will have to learn to love, to know feminine
wisdom, to bring sophia into hermeneutics, into the public law. We
do not need or want to banish the letter, but we must learn to relin-
quish its overweaning power. If we do not, the words will do what
they have begun to do in federal constitutional jurisprudence.
"[W]ords when abused take vengeance on the abusers. ' '2° Words be-
come autonomous, and when they act without spirit, they are deadly.
Words set loose without having been lived, without inwardness,
destroy. Helen Luke illuminates this through the poetical narrative of
Charles Williams, one of the circle (including Dorothy Sayers and C.
S. Lewis, as well as T.S. Eliot) dubbed the Inklings, about the dangers
of autonomy of coins and words.20 5 In one of the poems of his Arthu-
rian cycle, Williams portrayed the goodness of simple mutuality in
exchange; the coming of coins was to stand for this goodness. In
"Bors to Elayne: The King's Coins", Bors knows coins to be neces-
sary (even politically good), but is disturbed by the threat that the
coins' taking on a life of their own creates. Taliessin, the poet to the
king, shakes when he touches the coins, each with a little dragon on
one side and the king's head on the other. "I am afraid of the little
loosed dragons. When the means are autonomous, they are deadly;
when words escape from verse they hurry to rape souls; when sensa-
tion slips from intellect, expect the tyrant. ' 206 As Luke notes, Bors is
disturbed that compact is becoming contract, and knows that the
coins must be prayed for. The evil is not in the coins themselves but
in the loss in the person of "the link to the feeling values of
exchange."
A compact is, literally, an agreement based on feeling values; it
means a coming together in peace, cum pace. A contract is a legal
or financial agreement which binds outwardly, regardless of the
human feelings involved. So when compact becomes contract
within us, [people] begin to earn without paying or pay without
earning, and money is divorced from the meaning of exchange.
........ '.. When the means are autonomous they are deadly.'
When words escape from poetry, when the mint emerges from the
Temple, then souls are raped; speech becomes jargon, paying be-
comes bribing, earning becomes joyless necessity, and the acts of
exchange which are the glory of humanity become mere bargains.
(It would be hard to say whether words or coins are ahead nowadays
204. Heschel, supra note 23, at 25.
205. H. LUKE, WOMAN: EARTH AND SPIRIT 80-92 (1986).
206. Id. at 80-81.
2251
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
in the race to destroy souls.) (emphasis in original)2 7
Luke has correctly described what contract has become in our
society. It is no longer truly about the meeting of minds (or hearts),
but about words gone astray, holding power within themselves, dis-
connected from spirit. The warning Cooley gives against unguarded
words somehow giving away that which is inalienable, ungiveable, in-
trinsic to the person, is a warning against letter unmodified. Words
are ahead in the academy, in the race to destroy souls. In the practice
of law, the lawyer is in the more dangerous territory of both coins and
words used without care, words and coins cut off from feeling values,
moving like unguided automatons through the sensitive tissue of
human relatedness, sundering bodies and destroying souls.
Words gain autonomy because we want more certainty than life
can hold. We want to be able to predict, control, evaluate. Parker
Palmer reminds us that we have wanted control, assurances, but that
"in the quest to free knowledge from the tangles of subjectivity, we
have broken the knower free from the web of life itself. ' 20 We want
an agreement on social issues that are never fully resolvable, and we
hope to reach it by the light of reason. What this omits is truth by the
dark of mystery. It fails to honor the holy dark, to know that the
desert experiences are necessary to life. It denies the fecundity of the
dark soil, of the unlit womb, of the interaction of opposites, light and
dark.
Virginia Mollenkott recalls that as a Protestant, she was by her
upbringing, robbed of mystery.20 9 Rather than reminding her that in
the desert images of the Bible, God was always present as Other, her
tradition gave her linear logic and a god of perfection (who was, para-
doxically, Other because he was white, male, rich, able-bodied and
heterosexual). God was light, white, pure. Woman was dark, heavy,
seductive. God was spirit; woman was body. Matter was to be tran-
scended, analyzed, refined out. Through interpretation into thoughts
about things, we avoid transcendence through immanence and go
straight to transcendence, producing bloodless words with no ground-
ing. Mollenkott calls for "a new materialism, a new appreciation for
the surfaces and embodiment of things. ' 210 In the Bible she finds the
darkness which is "the matrix of all creation and in constant and nec-
207. Id. at 82.
208. P. PALMER, To KNOW AS WE ARE KNOWN 26 (1983).
209. Luke, supra note 205, at 64.
210. Id. at 65.
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essary alternation with light.... "211
In a discussion of technology and commitment, John
Staudenmaier chronicles the transition "from favoring light to absolu-
tizing it" following the advent of industrial capitalism.2"2 We have
become, he concludes, a culture that has lost the night. We are afraid
of the dark (dark-skinned, dark-sexed) because we have no reverence
for the holy dark, which requires "acceptance of uncertainty as a vir-
tue to complement clarity." He does not advocate wallowing in the
dark, being caught in the stasis of nihilism, but rather sustaining a
creative tension between light and dark.213 Without a sense of the
ultimate mystery, however, we will fall into a therapeutic individual-
ism that erodes our capacity for commitment. "No culture can long
survive if the binding energies of committed relationships unravel in a
tangle of short-term liaisons." '214 We only want to be committed to
what we know for sure, rather than grounding commitment in the
deeper soil of ultimate being. His call is, of course, a call to take back
the night. To do that we must risk what we do not know to enter
mystery with courage.
Ironically, the function of mystery is both to give strength to
what binds us, and to give freedom in the laws that bind. Mystery
allows us to know that we should follow commitments more than we
have, rather than making calculated self-interest our talisman, yet the
mystery of the spirit is that it comes to give the energy to live in free-
dom from law which has lost its soul. With the freedom of letter and
spirit created by love, we lose easy justification and false certitude; we
will be wrong. "Sin is necessary, but all will be well and all manner of
thing will be well."
215
We have always been in the dark as well as in the light, but we
now know ourselves as living in both. The dark is not terminal nihil-
ism or insuperable cynicism about law. We have begun to recognize
that from the dark, the greatest light emerges. Scientific insight from
"happenstance", Jesus resurrected from the tomb, poetry from chaos,
creation out of the ashes. Jacob wrestles with the Other in the dark,
and only when it is time does the struggle result in blessing. The
blessing, the gift of the abiding in darkness, is incommensurable:
211. Id. at 67.
212. "United States Technology and Adult Commitment," Studies in the Spirituality of
Jesuits, January 1987, at 1, 20-21.
213. Id. at 23.
214. Id. at 23.
215. Dame Julian of Norwich, SHOWINGS, Chapter XIII.
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That night, that year
Of now done darkness I wretch lay wrestling
with (my God!) my God.
2 16
Gerard Manley Hopkins shows the journey of it, the realization that
can only come as exclamation (the "aha" experience) in the midst of
flow.
Why should we trust the dark? Well, it is unavoidable. And
there are things that our souls know, which we do not always let our-
selves know we know.
In solitude.., we recognize a bond with each other that does not
depend on words, gestures, or actions, a good much deeper than
our own efforts can create ... we become aware that we were to-
gether before we came together and that community life is not a
creation of our will but an obedient response to the reality of our
own being united .. .we witness to a love that transcends our
interpersonal communications and proclaims that we love each
other because we have been loved first.2 17
This relationship with the dark is an acknowledgement of what we
know in our hearts. We find in deepest inwardness that we are
bonded with all, that there is covenant.
This is not yet fully a matter of public knowledge; we do not
know how to say it. In April of 1988, I was in Wisconsin right before
the Democratic primary; I read in Madison's Capital Times a clip
from an interviewer with a blue collar Jackson voter. Bemused but
alive, the worker exclaimed: "I'm gonna vote for that nigger; I like
him!" That painful paradox is a birthing cry, as Christin Lore Weber
observes: "The Black Goddess is rising in the soul of the world. '218
Even Darth Vadar has turned. His sequel is a holy baby girl, pro-
tected by Willow the tenderhearted dwarf. We are still confused in
our visions, but the visions have begun again.
All of this is, of course, politics. What I am writing is political;
what is my agenda? What do I hope the text will do? I am trying to
abide in uncertainty. I am searching for the good in the law. I am
advocating hope for the law. I am hoping for the claiming and inte-
gration of femine wisdom, and spirit, and mystery.219 These are risky.
216. POEMS AND PROSE OF GERARD MANLEY HOPKINS 61 (W.H. Gardner ed. 1953).
217. H. NOUWEN, CLOWNING IN ROME 14 (1979).
218. C. LORE WEBER, WOMANCHRIST 54 (1987).
219. See, e.g., A. CARR, TRANSFORMING GRACE (1989); S. MCFAGUE, MODELS OF GOD
(1987); R. Colker, "Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Towards Love, Compassion and Wis-
dom" (forthcoming).
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I hope to make room for aspiration as well as duty.220 I am hoping
that the people will participate in the interpretation of the text, and
that is risky. That does include challenge to the false certitude of
apologetics for the status quo, but it does not guarantee by any means
that the status quo will not be what prevails. Let me tell you a story
about the spirit of the law, the state constitutions, and Emeline Baty's
hogs.
If any creatures are particularly close to the earth, pigs are.
When pigs and railroads mix, who is likely to come out the better?
The Nebraska Supreme Court in 1877 was entrusted with the fate of a
law that said that if a train killed a farm animal and the railroad
didn't settle reasonably within 30 days, the farmer eventually got
double damages. The Court was moved to cite the spirit. It sang
Hurlbut; it chanted Doherty, it rejected "empty form." It grounded
itself in a "just regard of the public welfare" which overrode property
rights. It condemned favoritism, and stood for "one rule for the rich
and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plough." It
rang clear for fundamental principles of individual rights, the maxims
of the common law and the law of the land.221 The law of the land
was a pre-existing rule of conduct, and property was subject to the
rights of the community.22 2 The Court concluded that if Emeline
Baty could get more than the value of her pig, she could in principle
be given the entire railroad, and thus the law was no law because it
was not the law of the land. Justice could only come pig by pig, and
the railroads could continue to hold out 'til the cows came home (or
didn't).
The ways of the spirit of the law are mysterious, but invoking
them does not guarantee that my politics will win. Such an invoca-
tion does, however, render promise greater authenticity a little harder
to resist.
VIII. CALLING THE LAW OF THE LAND TO LIFE
One attraction of the law of the land is that it recalls us to a lost
heritage. "Without vision, without mystery, all of our fine intellectual
understanding and its great values turn to dust. ' 223 Or smog, or acid
rain. In the motif of Robert Frost, we have withheld ourselves from
our land and its law:
220. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 40-43, 184-86 (1969).
221. Baty, 6 Neb. at 46.
222. Id. at 42.
223. Luke, supra note 205, at 69.
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The land was ours before we were the land's
Something we were withholding made us weak
Until we found out that it was ourselves
We were withholding from our land of living,
And forthwith found salvation in surrender.
Such as we were we gave ourselves outright
To the land.224
Frost tells us that that land was only "vaguely realizing westward"
when we first gave ourselves to her; she was "still unstoried ... such
as she was, such as she would become." She is now so thickly storied
that she has again become chaotic, perishing for lack of a new story.
She is so poorly protected by law that her ecology is mortally endan-
gered. The stories she has, our High Court cannot hear, or has com-
plicated beyond retelling.
To find the story of our land we must find salvation in surrender.
We are who and where we are. We must start our stories near to
home. We must hear the warning cries of our polluted rivers and air,
of our nascent nuclear suicide. We must live, and choose the life
which we do not yet recognize, despite its mystery. We are now en-
franchised light and dark, male and female. If we continue to with-
hold ourselves, we will continue in unacknowledged and so infertile
dark. The spirit is indeterminate; the text is indeterminate; the future
is indeterminate. For the law to be good, it must be the law of the
land. We must reconnect spirit without loosing word. We must live
with spirit in the law, rather than under the law.225 To do that, we
must risk walking in the dark from time to time. Law is not, as
Holmes argued, only to make life predictable. It is to make life just
and good. It is to ensure a more perfect Union and to establish
justice.
Why, again, should we trust? We recall that Michelangelo saw
in an opaque, geometric block of marble, the living form of his statue,
which he had only to liberate. The vision is not only in the viewer-
the marble, the rock, the land, holds the vision for us as we wait to be
found in that vision. We will find truth and living law only by giving
ourselves to the land and all her people, only by "The Gift Outright."
If somehow in giving and love there is no goodness or justice, we are
losing nothing of real value by giving and loving. Even in giving and
love, there are no guarantees.
We can trust because we are blessed. Reflecting on law in Psalm
224. R. Frost, The Gift Outright in COLLECTED POEMS 348.
225. D. BONHOFFER, MEDITATING ON THE WORD (D. Gracie trans. 1987).
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119, Deitrich Bonhoffer observes that we no longer are bound by law
to perform before we are blessed; rather, we are now freed in love to
know that blessing comes first and obedience freely follows. 2 2 6 Our
land is a rich blessing. We can trust in part because we have hope.
Just as liberation theology points the people in local "base communi-
ties" towards studying Scripture on their own, developing state con-
stitutional law contains the local voices of the less elevated courts,
closer to the people. The scripture of the constitutions, many of
which are very close or identical in words to the federal document, is
being interpreted into being in fifty different states. The "new federal-
ism" has an unpredictable reality, which does not neatly follow any-
one's political agenda.2 2 7 It has the means for authenticity; it
practices the core virtue of American local government, participation.
It manifests a political restiveness and creativity too long absent in
this huge post-modern Leviathan. There are new voices in the land,
and new homes for new visions. We are taking back our texts, living
our laws.
The texts are public. To them we bring our own histories and
allegiances, our identities formed in diverse communities of faith (in-
cluding liberal secular humanism).228 We are, as Michael Sandel re-
minds us, encumbered selves. Our core beliefs are not chosen like
preferences; they are grown in our very being. 229 There, where deep-
est beliefs flourish and conflict, the text must be lived through. It
must be attended. It must be prayed, and then spoken in public, in a
discourse the unity of which we hope to see in experience and vision.
In our federal constitutional jurisprudence, we. have forgotten
what gives life to the reading of the text and the commentary on the
text. The discourse has become desiccated, its skeleton sucked dry by
the processes of over-politicizing an already unrooted positive law.
Let the whiteness of the bones atone to forgetfulness.
There is no life in them .... And the bones sang chirping
Under a juniper tree the bones sang, scattered and shining
We are glad to be scattered, we did little good to each
other,
Under a tree in the cool of the day, with the blessing of
sand,
226. Id.
227. Musk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEXAS L. REV.
1081 (1985); Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, EMERGING ISSUES IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-35 (1988).
228. Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 87 DUKE L.J. 997 (1987).
229. Sandel, supra note 17; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Forgetting themselves and each other, united
In the quiet of the desert. This is the land which ye
Shall divide by lot. And neither division nor unity
Matters. This is the land. We have our inheritance.23°
There is new moisture in the state courts; new ways of talking and
reclamation of fundamental law have loosed new streams of life-giv-
ing spirit to enflesh the "mere skeleton[s]" of the words of text. It is
time to prophesy, as Thomas Shaffer and Michael Perry and Michael
Walzer call us to be prophets,231 of the new voice and reconstituted
body of the polis, of the law of the land. It is time to call to the dry
bones of constitutional law. We have felt the frustration, the stasis.
We are called to move beyond Eliot's early desperation; it is no longer
time "to sit still." It is time to claim our inheritance and call it to life.
He said, "Prophesy over these bones.... Say, 'Dry bones, hear the
word of the Lord. The Lord God says this to these bones; I am
now going to make the breath enter you, and you will live ....
They keep saying 'Our bones are dried up, our hope has gone; we
are as good as dead.' . . . So say to them: ... I shall put my spirit
in you, and you will live, and I shall resettle you on your own soil.
Ezekiel 37:4-14.
We are on our own soil, but we have been unsettled, unsurrendered.
We have the means to bring the land to life; it begins in inwardness.
A dialogic community grows from the ground of what is common in
the heart.232 Whether we are internally faithful to Self, soul, mantra,
Force, Yahweh, Allah, Goddess, Other or unknown, we have within,
the adequate and only resources for animating the law so that it is not
autonomous and deadly 233 but integrated and inspired. To summon
this, we must take an attitude that is like the famous prayer, "I be-
lieve; help thou my unbelief," that is, an attitude of attention to the
inner law, knowing we will never get it right. We will have to "hope
to turn again" in time: "In and through even the best speech for Ulti-
mate Reality, greater obscurity eventually emerges to manifest a reli-
gious sense of that Reality as ultimate mystery. "234
That attitude of attention which knows its inherent flaws, as-
230. Eliot, "Ash Wednesday" supra note 40, 87-88.
231. T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981); M. PERRY, MORAL-
ITY, POLITICS AND THE LAW (1988); M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM
(1987).
232. See S. CAVELL, THE UNCANNINESS OF THE ORDINARY (1988) esp. chap. 6.
233. Herzog, supra note 120, at 625 (praising liberal law's autonomy); Weinrib, Legal For-
malism: On the Immanent Rationality of the Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
234. Tracy, supra note 9, at 108.
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sumes some form of common humanity, some inchoate level of the
law in our hearts, which we can tap, participate in, and speak from,
but never codify adequately. It is a form of "original intent" that
assumes that we stand equal before God (or Ultimate Reality) and in
our experience of trying to reach that inward place, we can approach
knowing the best of what those who tried to put law into words,
meant. As Eckhart notes, the best way to know the sense and truth of
the Scriptures is to be in the spirit in which the scripture-writer wrote
them.235 What Herzog calls Coke's almost mystical reverence for the
common law" 236 is the faith that the people do have in their spirit
access to the wisdom of their hearts, and they will find the law there
as they come to reclaim their text. "The rebirth of the word comes in
the process of conversation; ' 237 this is a call to conversation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Holmes could have said much of what Juniper said, I suspect.
Despite the argument that law and morality have nothing to do with
one another, that law must operate as if aimed at the bad person, and
that law is to make life predictable, Holmes was an inveterate poet of
the spirit of the living law of the land. He sounded all the American
canons of pragmatism, near-cynicism, and "realism" yet sang of the
law's spirit. 238 He called practitioners to read and ponder on the
"remoter and more general" aspects of the law, which would lead not
only to mastery within one's calling, but to connection "with the uni-
verse and [catching] an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathom-
able process, a hint of the universal law."' 239 The way to that infinite,
that unfathomable, that universal law, was through knowing a word
not as unchanging but as "the skin of a living thought." 2"
Lawyers and judges rub up against that skin of words all the
time; the people of the land live in that skin as they participate as the
direct and indirect parties in and out of court. They are thinking
about the law, as the public reaction to the Bork nomination showed.
They must think about the law, because it shapes much of their lives.
And they are a rich source of potential interpretation of the law. As
235. TREATISES AND SERMONS OF MEISTER ECKHART 130-31 (J. Clark and J. Skinner
trans. 1983).
236. Herzog, supra at note 120, at 624.
237. Shawn Elliott, 3rd year, University of Nebraska, College of Law.
238. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920); See Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989).
239. Id., "The Path of the Law" at 167, 170.
240. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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liberation theologies encourage the foundational project of popular
biblical studies in base communities, so state constitutional law brings
the interpretation of our legal, social texts closer to the people. If a
language is a form of life, then what better contribution to interpreta-
tion and sustenance of that language, than that of the people? To step
to the state level is to move where the words of the texts are "less
encrusted with layers of court decisions."241 It is to move where judi-
cial election, local questions and ballot initiatives bring the courts
closer to the people. It is to move where the spirit of the law of the
land may be a little easier to hear. We have heard it before.
In this rhythm of conversation and prayer, of inwardness and
outwardness, will either the primarily public or the primarily private
transcend sectarian vision? I would suggest that the answer is yes and
no. We can not sustain the perfectly objective "God's Eye" view 24 2
and we cannot capture it in words, even if we are to hope to touch it
from time to time. Our subjectivity is particular as well as universal.
But the hope is that a community of dialogue which reaches even the
"theys" can be sustained, in the right spirit.2 43 Robert Cover talks
about a spirit of obligation based on Torah, which is deeper, richer,
truer than a rights-first sense of obligation. To him, this is com-
mand.2" To me, it is invitation, as his own account of mitzvah is
inviting. The invitation is to acknowledge the bonds of solidarity
which we have been given, to claim the spirit of our land and its law.
The invitation is to resurrect the story of the People's vitality. Law
will still have its violence, but we will not be hopeless in the face of
our own inevitable flaws.
I hope this essay has met the reader with some "echo of the Infi-
nite," "unfathomable" law toward which Holmes aspired. It was in-
tended to present Heschel's wisdom about the relations among
inwardness, word and bond which a praying of text involves, and to
recommend that process of attention as a crucial aspect of interpret-
ing law. The language and deliberations of 19th century state courts
portrayed a vision of the law's spirit, alive in and yet beyond words of
law. Those state opinions acknowledged the unfathomable but turned
to speak in words which aspired to call forth the living law from the
241. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1181
(1985).
242. See H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 50 (1981).
243. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984).
244. Cover, Obligation, supra note 200, at 74.
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public text. The texts of state constitutional law remain public, and
the discourse of those texts is a promising place to hear and talk about
the law of the land. The fruits of spirited discourse include an enliv-
ened law, a sense of bond in our communities, and even times and
places of peace and justice.
